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Martyrs in Revolution: Can the Symbol Sustain the Struggle?

by

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especially in regards to the final structure of my paper and components of my models. Finally, I would like to thank Captain Glenn R. Walker whose friendship, wit, and wisdom provided me with a new outlook on the world of academia.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Persuasion has long been lauded as an essential tool to induce communities to adopt a specific behavior. In non-hostile, economically competitive environments, such as the commercial marketing field, persuasion manifests itself in mass advertising campaigns to convince potential purchasers to buy a particular product. The most successful of these marketing strategies involve sensational, glitzy campaigns to attract notice. As evidence, look no further than today's tabloid magazines and television shows that report lurid stories concerning the sexual deviancy of a popular music star or the suicide of a young actor. As the hype concerning these reports build, circulation rates increase and viewer ratings soar. Sensationalism sells no matter what the environment. In hostile, socio-politically competitive environments, such as states embroiled in revolution, persuasive efforts focus instead on inducing the population to either support or reject contending parties in the conflict. Typically, revolutionary "markets" become rife with their own all too familiar advertising campaigns and are characterized by the use of familiar cultural settings, catchy slogans, and powerful symbols. As with any advertising campaign, the more sensational and spectacular the theme, the greater the chance for revolutionaries to influence the behavior of their target audience. Among revolutionary movements throughout the course of history and spanning ethnically and culturally drawn borders, one particular sensational propaganda technique figures prominently - the use of martyr images.

Crucifixions, stake burnings, tortuous death by dismemberment, being eaten alive by jungle beasts - What can cause a greater sensation than the violent, grisly death of a human being? Of all the historical symbols of propaganda, the martyr has been the most sensational and effective psychological weapons of mass persuasion known to man. Embraced by diverse secular ideologies across the continuum of the political spectrum, as well as by a multitude of religious sects, the martyr's appeal has seemingly had a universal reach. In fact, nearly every revolution in modern times has been defined by either its archetypal martyr or by a pantheon of fallen "saviors." Unfortunately, these symbols of political and religious violence have remained fully within the realm of sensationalism, with vast literary attention being devoted to adulating biographies or scathing denunciations of their images. They have, in fact, garnered little scholarly attention, nor have they been subjected to the rigors of analytical research. This thesis, therefore, attempts to correct these previous academic oversights.

The purpose of this study is to explore the phenomenon of martyrdom within the context of revolution. The pages that follow are animated by three research questions - 1) What is the essence of the martyr's character and why has it been embraced by disparate movements throughout history? 2) How and under what conditions are martyrs created? And finally, 3) Do some martyrs possess a greater potential to incite action and if so how might revolutionary groups use these images to further their edicts upon society? By addressing these questions this thesis is meant to be both a descriptive and an analytical exercise which formulates a string of hypotheses related to martyrs as tools of psychological operations. My hypotheses are:

1) Martyrs have increasingly become political and militant figures. This change of character can be clearly traced throughout the course of history from early religious movements to more modern secular ideologies.

2) The martyr is not self-made. He is a product of his society and his creation is conditionally dependent upon the nature of his social environment, as well as a number of necessary and sufficient catalysts.

3) Although martyrs carry inherent powers of sensational attraction, their persuasive effectiveness is relative and measurable. Each revolutionary martyr's symbolic power is dependent upon the transformation of his image into one of a *paradigmatic truth*,¹ with some revolutionary martyrs carrying greater effective power than others. Once created the ultimate success of the martyr depends upon bureaucratic strategies which determine the orientation pattern - passive or active - of the symbol.

The definitive goal throughout the course of this thesis is to develop an analytical framework to assess the martyr's effectiveness in mobilizing and radicalizing an incipient, latent community to adopt the cause of revolution. In so doing, it is my hope that this research will be fruitful to policy makers and operators within the United States Departments of Defense and State in their on going efforts to more clearly understand and

¹Many sociologists refer to this process as myth-building. Myths, however, are value laden terms carrying with them an inherent bias. Those which believe the myth are "uninformed," "naive," or "uneducated." Those which do not believe in the myth or often regarded as adhering to another unabashed truth. For the purpose of this study, I will use the term *paradigmatic truth*, borrowed from sociologist and author Bruce Lincoln. This term refers to a social charter which communities use as a template for defining the authority of truth. See Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 24.

effectively employ psychological operations in revolutionary conflicts around the globe.

The design of this thesis first took shape by canvassing existing theories concerning political conflict, religious violence, and political symbolism. Clearly, no one theory among this list, whether structural, systems or actor - oriented, is sufficiently able to explain the impact martyrs have had upon their societies. This is due to an overwhelming academic reliance to empirically measure indicators associated with conflicts. The abstract image of the martyr does not lend itself to such measurement and thus remains largely a foreign entity to these models. Instead, it is necessary to look beyond these theories toward other social science disciplines to accommodate for the image of the martyr. These disciplines - sociology, anthropology, theology, and psychology - provide additional theoretical insight into the immaterial causes of violence and social conflict and allow for the formulation of more robust and inclusive models. What follows in this study, therefore, is a liberal synthesis of competitive theories that covers an expanse of disciplines in order to account for and explain the martyr and its place within revolution.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. The following chapter traces the martyr throughout history in order to more clearly highlight its evolutionary change of character as a tool of political violence and political agitation. The core of Chapter III involves a the development of a structural theory toward the creation of the martyr within his social environment. In this chapter a model is used to portray key social conditions, critical events, and catalytic factors which contribute to the creation of martyrs and help to distinguish them above heroes and patriots of revolutionary movements. Chapter IV presents yet another model which helps track the amplification of the martyr image and

its effectiveness along three dimensions - truth perception, credibility and legitimate authority. By offering cases to illustrate this model, I demonstrate how some martyrs may achieve greater success at persuading their communities than others. I also identify and explain those bureaucratic controls necessary for the revolutionary movements to fully "sell" and capitalize on the potential influence a martyr has upon a community. Finally, in Chapter V I summarize my arguments based upon the previously stated analyses in the body of the work and I will offer suggestions for additional study on the role of martyrs in the future.

Can symbols sustain revolutionary struggles? Of course. As has been evidenced within numerous revolutions, societies in turmoil have thrived on the ritual and pomp created within an aura of political symbols. To the extent that certain symbols remain inherently more powerful than others, however, remains the gist of this thesis. Martyrs are the preeminent symbols of militant political propaganda. And some martyrs more than others continue to entrance and incite their communities for thousands of years. If we can uncover the potential power that each martyr holds for its community, we can attempt to either exploit it or determine a strategy to attack its symbolic effect. In so doing we can enhance our own strategies of psychological operations in the future.

I. INTRODUCTION

Persuasion has long been lauded as an essential tool to induce communities to adopt a specific behavior. In non-hostile, economically competitive environments, such as the commercial marketing field, persuasion manifests itself in mass advertising campaigns to convince potential purchasers to buy a particular product. The most successful of these marketing strategies involve sensational, glitzy campaigns to attract notice. As evidence, look no further than today's tabloid magazines and television shows that report lurid stories concerning the sexual deviancy of a popular music star or the suicide of a young actor. As the hype concerning these reports build, circulation rates increase and viewer ratings soar. Sensationalism sells no matter what the environment. In hostile, socio-politically competitive environments, such as states embroiled in revolution, persuasive efforts focus instead on inducing the population to either support or reject contending parties in the conflict. Typically, revolutionary "markets" become rife with their own all too familiar advertising campaigns and are characterized by the use of familiar cultural settings, catchy slogans, and powerful symbols. As with any advertising campaign, the more sensational and spectacular the theme, the greater the chance for revolutionaries to influence the behavior of their target audience. Among revolutionary movements throughout the course of history and spanning ethnically and culturally drawn borders, one particular sensational propaganda technique figures prominently - the use of martyr images.

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A. OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study is to explore the phenomenon of martyrdom within the context of revolution. The pages that follow are animated by three research questions - 1) What is the essence of the martyr's character and why has it been embraced by disparate movements throughout history? 2) How and under what conditions are martyrs created? And finally, 3) Do some martyrs possess a greater potential to incite action and if so how might revolutionary groups use these images to further their edicts upon society? By addressing these questions this thesis is meant to be both a descriptive and

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B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

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This resulting design dictated the auspices for the research methodology concerning the subject at hand. Most analyses rely solely upon either a limited number of case studies - often two or three - or the lengthy compilation of data bases to provide the scholarly methodological structure to social scientific research. Neither of these methods

alone serves justice to this study. The latter approach, the data base, is firmly rooted to empirical, objective studies. Clearly, the data base may be used to illustrate ideal, typical "profiles" of the research subject. In this case, martyrs may be examined using a number of criteria (age at death, education level, marital status, etc.). This method does little to measure the effect an abstract image has upon an audience. The former approach of limited case studies also research misgivings. While the case study approach enables a selectively controlled sample, it does so at the cost of ignoring a multitude of exemplary martyrs in revolution.

Thus, the most appropriate methodology for this study is to enjoin both popular research methods. I will therefore conduct a controlled comparative analysis, using a variety of historical cases, but I will also establish an austere data base to develop an ideal martyr profile. Analytical control measures designed to reduce the sample of the martyr population eligible involve three restrictive criteria. First, only those martyrs created from within *regime replacement* and *communal revolutions*² will be among those used in the sample. Second, only *paradigmatic martyrs* - those which are singled out (whether by the revolutionary organization or by any other audience) above others as the prominent or leading images of each particular struggle - were the subjects for this

²Characterized by Chalmers Johnson, these revolutions include those attempts to enact social change, involving as their means the intrusion of extreme forms of violence into normally civil-social relations. The "Simple" or "Regime Replacement Revolutions" achieve their ends by merely replacing a regime, such as the American Revolution, which replaced the parliamentary monarchy with democratic rule. The "Complex," "Total," or "Communal Revolutions" seek to replace the entire social structure of a state. Such was the case during the French and Russian Revolutions. See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-15 and pp. 122-135.

analytical research. Third, this study only analyzes those martyrs that actually died during their struggles with an authoritative regime. This eliminates a multitude of proclaimed martyrs that suffered through imprisonment or persecution.³

Next, I will apply multi-variable reduction techniques using the adaptation of various theories, to identify distinctive qualities and common parallels between martyrs within the research sample. Using this deductive approach, the construct for analytical models is simplified. Common themes within this thesis could then be explained by using the most illustrative examples from within the sample martyr population. The resulting study is hopefully more well rounded, less confined, and remains as the most interesting approach to this topic.

C. ORGANIZATION

This thesis is organized into five chapters. The following chapter traces the martyr throughout history in order to more clearly highlight its evolutionary change of character as a tool of political violence and political agitation. The core of Chapter III involves a the development of a structural theory toward the creation of the martyr within his social environment. In this chapter a model is used to portray key social conditions, critical events, and catalytic factors which contribute to the creation of martyrs and help to distinguish them above heroes and patriots of revolutionary movements. Chapter IV presents yet another model which helps track the amplification of the martyr image and its effectiveness along three dimensions - truth perception, credibility and legitimate

³For a list of martyrs used as the analytical sample, see Appendix A.

authority. By offering cases to illustrate this model, I demonstrate how some martyrs may achieve greater success at persuading their communities than others. I also identify and explain those bureaucratic controls necessary for the revolutionary movements to fully "sell" and capitalize on the potential influence a martyr has upon a community. Finally, in Chapter V I will summarize my arguments based upon the previously stated analyses in the body of the work and I will offer suggestions for additional study on the role of martyrs in the future.

D. A NOTE ON SOURCES

As has been evidenced throughout the course of the last three centuries, it is a rare event when revolutions succeed. The majority of revolutionary attempts are, in fact, utter failures. The glaring tendency of regimes who finally do win out over their contentious pretenders is to strike their influence from the annals of social consciousness. What therefore transpires is the loss of first hand sources from those organizational "directors" responsible for propagating martyr images. One such glaring example to this dilemma is the destruction or loss of the early diaries of the world's most infamous propagandist, Dr. Josef Goebbels. The vast proportion of material available for researching martyrs in revolution is therefore contained in secondary sources. Whenever possible, however, recent primary sources were consulted. These included organizational manifestos, journalistic interviews, and a multitude of published speeches and diaries. Although plagued with propagandist overtones, these sources did enable me to trace first hand accounts of how revolutionaries viewed martyrdom. Having full and prior knowledge of

their prejudiced views made me also more sensitive to assessing martyrs in an objective light.

II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MARTYR

Comparing martyrs as a collective body is problematic. A preliminary examination of their characteristic nature reveals that martyrs are, in fact, incompatible symbols. As Max Weber wrote, there exists a traditional family of martyrs who willingly accept persecution and torture as a means to demonstrate their faith, labelled as passive ascetics.¹ Typically associated with religion, these martyrs have come to symbolize an unrelenting faith in a divine being and predestined course for humanity. It is from this religious backdrop that the earliest martyrs appeared. On the other hand, we know that there exists another body of martyrs far different from those of their withdrawn cousins. This subsequent body of martyrs embraced more worldly beliefs - that man can and should influence his own destiny. Primarily militant and political, these martyrs have most notably been associated with a gamut of secular ideologies including fascism, communism, and liberal democracy. They demonstrate their faith through action and they adopt violence in order to change their own individual course and the course of their community. It is only through this violence that they are in turn persecuted, tortured or killed.

This predominant martyr typology begs further analysis. First, we know that not all religious martyrs were ascetics. The rabbinical figure Akiba ben Josef, Roman Catholic Saint Joan of Arc and Shi'ite Imam Husayn, all driven by their religious convictions, led

¹Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischhoff, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 227-229.

their congregations into battle against blaspheming oppressors. We also know that not all political martyrs adopt violence. Prominent pacifist martyrs such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Ghandi opposed all forms of violence during their political efforts to persuade authorities. Finally, contemporary studies involving revolution show that social upheaval is rarely defined by purely secular or religious schisms. More often revolution occurs when political and religious grievances are coterminous and multiplicative.² Thus, it follows that the revolutionary martyr would acquire both political and religious significance.

This chapter attempts to revise the current typology by offering a more complete description and analysis of martyrs since their inception. It suggests that martyrs share other more important commonalities than their titular honor or subjection to persecution suggests. These common bonds tie martyrs throughout more than two millennia to broad processes of social change, including revolutions. While this study is devoted to martyrs in revolution, it would be foolhardy to divorce them from their historical antecedents and those which may succeed them. Revolutionary martyrs are merely a piece of a continuum of man's struggle to assert his beliefs within oppressive settings. Therefore, it is the aim of this chapter to examine and trace how the revolutionary martyr evolved from a passive ascetic to a political militant.

²See Bruce Lincoln's Introduction to Religion, Rebellion, and Revolution: An interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collection of essays, ed. Bruce Lincoln, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp 3-11. In it he provides an overview of the impact of religious thought from the French Revolution of 1789 to the 1978 Iranian Revolution.

In so doing, it is my goal to examine both distinguishing and common characteristics of martyrs along a thematic, if not time-sensitive path. This analysis will cover four historical phases: religious unitarian movements, religious sectarian and communal movements, secular ideologies, and reactionary and fundamentalist movements. I will then portray this evolution using a descriptive model in an attempt to offer a visual depiction of the martyr and its defining attributes within each phase. Finally, I will offer some tentative predictions concerning the use of martyrs by contending groups in the future.

A. THE UNITARIAN FAITHS

Sociologists generally accept that the concept of martyrdom developed from an amalgam of religious ideologies. Among them, noted sociologist and author, Mircea Eliade posits:

The religions of Egypt and Mesopotamia and Greek philosophy treat ideologies as distinct cultural realities already hosting the seeds of the ideas of active good and evil and heroism. Zoroastrian dualism proposed an independent evil force, and Judaism of the Meccabean age adapted this view of a struggle with evil for monotheism. Hellenism [in turn] brought a personalistic element to the ideologies in the image of the ascetic philosopher [or prophet].³

Thus, many conclude that martyrs are a rather recent ideological phenomenon dating not farther back than the fourth century BCE⁴ to the time of the Ancient Macedonian Empire under Alexander the Great. In fact, the word martyr is derived from the Greek martyr,

³Mircea Eliade, et al, The Encyclopedia of Religion, (New York: MacMillen Publishing Company, 1987), p. 230.

⁴Ibid, p. 230.

meaning "witness."⁵ But it is within the Judaic faith that the earliest recorded martyrs appeared.

The creation of the martyr image is rooted in the era of the Second Temple, when Ezra rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem, affirmed to deny cultic movements, and pressed for further legal reforms.⁶ Jews by that time had virtually completed their efforts to reunify their constituency, yet they remained as subjects under the domain of another authority. These authorities, first the Macedonians and then the Seleucids, had their own legal codes and expected the Jews to honor them. Bound by Mosaic and Davidic laws the Jews were destined for another cycle of religious persecution. It was during this time, that Jews began to adorn multitudes of their persecuted brethren with a sacrosanct homage. H. H.

Ben- Sasson notes:

Martyrdom, the hallowing of God's Name, held a central position in their thought, and praises were sung of the martyrs. [They - the pious ones] spoke of their longing for martyrdom, recording the disappointment of a man who wished to hallow the Name but was never privileged to do so and reckoning how much smaller his portion would be than that of his comrades who did hallow the Name, for he died in bed while the others were the 'leaders of the slain.'⁷

Thus, Jews were not only taught of the necessity to reject Hellenic temptations and influences contrary to the laws of Moses and David, but it became a privilege and honor

⁵Ibid, p. 230.

⁶This date was confirmed by a number of Jewish theological sources as well as historical sources including: The Jewish Encyclopedia, ed. Isidore Singer, et al, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1906), pp. 353-356; A History of the Jewish People, ed. H.H. Ben-Sasson, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 550-553; and An Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, ed. William J. Langer, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 5th edition, p. 46.

⁷Ben-Sasson, p. 553.

to willingly submit and die in the name of Jehovah when their rulers forced them to choose between Mosaic and Greek laws. In return for their suffering their names would be forever remembered as part of the *kedoshim*, or holy honor roll. Secondly, Jews believed that Jehovah might be favorably disposed to intercede upon the oppressed Jewish community's behalf if their martyrs' sacrifices were sufficiently deserving of such action.

Early Christendom follows much the same pattern as this initial Judaic pattern. It also provides a host of martyrs for examination, beginning with its prototypical paradigm, the Son of God - Jesus Christ. Crucified at Golgotha, Christ's martyrdom was similar to those of the early Jewish martyrs - ascetic and passive - in that it centered upon His selfless sacrifice of life. But in one important way it paved a different path. Not only would subsequent Christian martyrs' names be hallowed, but they would be exempt from final judgment and promised eternal life after death.⁸ Thus, the willingness to submit to persecution and torture became even more attractive to early Christians than it had been for the Jews in the fourth and third centuries BCE. To die as Christ died was not only a desired end but it was an actively pursued goal. Subsequent Christian history is replete with such examples. First, Christ's disciples willingly proselytized His gospel even as Roman authorities continued to dole out equally appalling brutalities against those who spoke about His prophecies.⁹ The disciples, in turn, were followed by their appointed

⁸Eliade, p. 230.

⁹The New Testament provides a description of the spectacular deaths and martyrdom of Christ's disciples. Among them John the Baptist was beheaded by King Herod of Judea to gain the affection of his brother Phillip's wife, Herodias. The Apostle James was also slain by Herod, this time by the sword. The Apostle Paul, once granted clemency by Caesar, was subsequently killed during the Roman persecutions of the Christians, sometime after 60 CE.

apostolic "witnesses" who pursued similar paths and who died in equally spectacular fashion.¹⁰ A cyclical and generational pattern of faithful Christians who sought sacrificial redemption ensued up to the third century CE as Christians voluntarily gave their lives in the infamous carnage undertaken at the Roman Circuses.¹¹

The last monotheistic religion, Islam, also embraced martyrdom in its initial phase.

Max Weber offers this assessment:

Islam, a comparatively late product of Near Eastern monotheism, in which Old Testament and Jewish-Christian elements played a very important role, 'accommodated' itself unto the world in a very unique sense. In the first Meccan period of Islam, the eschatological religion of Muhammed developed in pietistic urban conventicles which displayed a tendency to withdraw from the world.¹²

This is evidenced early on in the *Koran*. Initially rejected and persecuted for his prophetic visions, Muhammed took flight during the *Hegira* to gain adherents and formulate an effectively organized band. Although Muhammed's martyrdom is inherently less sensational and painful than his Judo-Christian forebears (involving a limited and restrained persecution - banishment from Mecca), it does repeat similar themes. During this period, as Weber suggests, Muhammed and his followers were content to remain withdrawn from the rest of the Arab tribes and communities of the time. Rather than aspiring to achieve political and military successes, Muhammed instead chose to remain

¹⁰ Among the seven later "deacons" of Christ chosen by the twelve disciples, Stephen is the most famous. His preaching and defense of Christ before the Jewish elders at the Temple led to his stoning and subsequent martyrdom.

¹¹ For an in depth review concerning martyrdom in early Christianity see John Foxe, *Foxe's Christian Martyrs of the World*, (Westwood: Barbour Books, 1985), pp. 3-27.

¹² Weber, p. 262.

ascetic and passive, and build unity amongst his faithful. When their faith was sufficient, Allah would empower His prophet to deliver unto them their promised salvation. Only later would Muhammed transform Islam from its early pristine form to one of a communal form.¹³

In summary, all martyrs during unitary religious movements, as their associated era suggests, became hallowed symbols of religious unification. During these periods Judaic, Christian, and Islamic martyrs remained ascetic and passive to gain favor with God. Also during these religious periods the three monotheistic faiths embraced the belief that although the final coming of God was predetermined, martyrdom could prove worthy of a limited intercession by God on behalf of the martyr's entire community. This led to a universal adoption within the faiths of a millenarian expectation,¹⁴ or a belief that an unrelenting faith and commitment to God would deliver a Messiah to initiate the millennium, especially if that community had been graced by a martyr. In the Judeo-Christian faiths, the example of one martyr caused others to follow in his path, initiating an emulative and regenerative pattern. The paradigmatic martyrdom of Islam during this period is limited to one exemplar - the Prophet Muhammed. These characteristics, however, would soon change.

¹³Ibid, p. 262.

¹⁴For a more complete definition of millenarian expectation see David C. Rapoport, "Terror and the Messiah: An Ancient Experience and Some Modern Parallels," in The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, ed. David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 13-42.

B. THE SECTARIAN AND COMMUNAL FAITHS

For whatever reason, when the unitary faiths began to acquire a sectarian or communal character, martyrs began to acquire an inherently more political and militant symbolic nature. While not all "spinoff" sects from the three religious faiths analyzed in the previous section espoused a more political and militant path for their martyrs, at least every faith produced one such sect that openly embraced this new breed of martyr. Let us now examine the incorporation of this new found pattern.

By the middle of the Second Century BCE, the Jews in Palestine suffered renewed persecutions, this time by the Seleucids. After murdering his brother Seleucus, Antiochus IV Epiphenes, succeeded in securing the throne of the Seleucid Empire for himself. Known by the Jews as "Antiochus the Wicked,"¹⁵ he proceeded not just to force Hellenization upon his Jewish subjects but to de-nationalize them entirely.¹⁶ The Community of Jews became split between those who remained unfailingly loyal to Mosaic Law and those who were willingly to accept the imposed hellenistic laws. H. H. Ben-Sasson notes:

Mattathias became the recognized leader of the entire community of the *Hasidim* [the pious ones] and was instrumental in adopting several important decisions that were accepted by all the insurgents. Perhaps the most important of these was the ruling that permitted the Jews to take up arms even on the Sabbath in order to repulse attacks.¹⁷

By 168 BCE Mattathias' son, Judas of Maccabee, led the first of a series of uprisings against the Seleucids. This would eventually obtain religious freedom for all Jews but also

¹⁵Singer, p. 634.

¹⁶Ibid, pp. 634-635.

¹⁷Ben-Sasson, p. 553.

established an autonomous, theocratic kingdom for the Jews in Palestine. Killed in battle, Judas became the first *paradigmatic martyr* of the Jews in this new era.

Although successful in obtaining greater political stature for the Jews, the Meccabean revolt was not instrumental in reunifying their community, nor did it prevent the renewal of persecutions against them. Instead, a definitive generational pattern of sectarianism, rebellion, persecution, and militant martyrdom ensued. Successive rulers in Jerusalem would pay homage to their higher authorities by accepting sacrifices for the emperor, displaying busts of emperors in the Temple, or adorning other hallowed places with icons.¹⁸ This inevitably led to charges of transgressions against Mosaic Law and caused still other sects to break away from their Jewish community. These new sects often maintained an exclusive communal and often militant character, rejecting their incorporation into the Jewish community as a whole. They included the Sadducees, Pharisees, and the Essenes and later a number of Zealot groups such as the Sicarii. Some of these sects offered passive resistance to their rulers while others adopted full-scale terrorist campaigns.¹⁹ A panapoly of both passive and militant Judaic martyrs soon followed.

Each rebellion would generally start with moderates leading their communities in peaceful protest against the authorities only to be undermined by small, yet politicized

¹⁸First, under Augustus Caesar the Jews were required to make sacrifices for the emperor as a compromise to allow their right to worship and exempt their participation in the imperial cult. Second, Herod and then Pontius Pilate tried to further please Rome by erecting "standards" of the Empire in "the conventional way to symbolize" Jewish loyalty to Rome. See David C. Rapoport, pp. 18-21.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 21.

militant factions.²⁰ Under King Herod (around 4 CE), a student protest against golden images of eagles adorning the Temple quickly turned into a violent demonstration as members of the Temple proceeded to tear the golden eagles down.²¹ Herod proclaimed later that only the rabbis who had incited the students were to be burned alive for this deed. With each succeeding generation, however, the level of atrocities grew until by 66 CE²², we can account for perhaps the greatest feat of mass martyrdom in history. Author David C. Rapoport notes:

The fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple virtually ended resistance in Judea. It was only a matter of time before the last stronghold at Masada fell. When the Romans penetrated its outer defenses, the most spectacular act of Jewish despair and defiance occurred. The entire garrison of nearly a thousand Sicarii, including women and children, committed suicide rather than become Roman prisoners.²³

By 132 the Jews, nearly annihilated as a race, participated in the anticlimactic Bar Kokhba Revolt. A Jewish rebel force led by Simon Bar Kokhba and inspired by a number of militant rabbis participated in a desperate last stand against the Roman army. Thousands of Jews were killed.²⁴ Those that were not slain were captured and subjected to violent reprisals noted for their horrific tortures and deaths. These reprisals produced the "Ten Great Martyrs" of Jewish religious lore. Perhaps the greatest among these ten

²⁰Ibid, p. 23.

²¹Ibid, p. 20.

²²Author's Note: From this point on in the chapter all dates cited are within the common era, therefore I will refrain from using the abbreviations CE and BCE.

²³Ibid, p. 26.

²⁴Roman Historian Dio Cassius claimed that 580,000 Jews lost their lives in the Bar Kokhba Revolt, as cited by Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 91.

martyrs is the Rabbi Akiba ben-Josef whose death sentence was carried out by having his flesh torn off with a carding instrument.²⁵ After the Jewish rebellion was finally defeated, the Great Diaspora followed. Although disbanded as a people and cast off into the hinterlands of Europe and Asia Minor, Jewish traditions were passed on. These included the now vogue tradition of the politicized, militant martyr.

Not more than two centuries after Jewish sectarian presence in the known world had withered away, Christian sects had begun again to tread on the heels of their Jewish antecedents. By the fourth century, Christianity had spread throughout much of Europe and to other corners of civilization. Slowly, it was embraced, almost universally, by whole ethnic communities. It was during this time that "religion" and "community" became synonymous and resulted in the conceptual foundation of a "national" church. Implicit also within this synthesis was the politicization of religion and the slow erosion of passive asceticism to political militancy in the Christian sectarian movements.²⁶ This evolution is best illustrated by the establishment and early history of the Armenian Church.

A federation of small feudal kingdoms at the periphery of Europe and the Middle East, for centuries early Armenian society was under the domination of a number of foreign powers. Rule of the kingdoms was granted to native functionaries who served two communities - their foreign masters and their local populace. Their position was, at

²⁵Singer, pp. 355-356.

²⁶Khachig Toloyan, "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora," Contemporary Research on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 90.

best, a tenable one. If the local functionary was to succeed, he had to satisfy both groups. First, he had to prove his loyalty and subservience to his overlord. Next, he had to compete for and gain the acquiescence of the Armenian people. In short, the local functionary had to be a shrewd and manipulative politician. Author Khachig Toloyan notes that:

[local] elites [had to] claim to be warriors for the nation; caretakers of its all-too-needy; or guardians of the immortal soul of the Armenian individuals and the equally transcendent soul of the Nation. Such claims [were] formulated, disseminated, and perpetuated principally in narratives which are part of the fabric of the culture, shaping individual and collective self-conceptions..., what matters is that since the establishment of the Armenian Church, the 'warrior' has come to imply martyrdom as a necessary correlate, or has been replaced by it outright. The militant martyr has become a substitute for the warrior in the cultural struggle for validation and legitimacy.²⁷

We have to look no further than the narrative of Saint Vartan, father of the Armenian nation, to prove Toloyan's assertion.

Faced by the almost certain political and religious subjugation under the invading Persian Sassanid armies, Armenian Lord Vartan and members of his community took to battle at Avarayr. Annihilated at this "last stand" in the year 450, the example of Vartan and his followers eventually led to a Persian conciliation to Armenian religious suffrage by 485. Nearly fifteen hundred years later, Vartan still generates an endearing and passionate response from nearly all Armenians. Vartan is still seen as having risked all in defense of Armenian Christianity and continues to be regarded as Armenia's most precious saint as witnessed by the familiar recitation at the beginning of Armenian-

²⁷Ibid, p. 91.

American Knights of Vartan meetings - "I am Armenian., I am Armenian/The grandchild of valiant Vartan."²⁸

Other Christian sects also mimicked the extremist zeal and fervor of the early Jewish sects, especially when it came to the adoption of suicide in their struggles against a repressive regime. The African Circumcelliones are a typical example of this early Christian period. A Donatist sect of the fourth century, the Circumcelliones "combined guerrilla activity against Catholic landowners with a greedy quest for martyrdom and with mass suicide in the name of a strongly radical faith."²⁹ This adoption of suicide was a shortlived phenomenon in Christian sectarian movements, however, as even the most extreme sects later rejected it entirely arguing that it transgressed upon the sanctity of life and the most precious teachings of Christ.³⁰

With regard to Islam, the transformation of the martyr image from one of passive ascetic to political militant was a foreboding one even prior to the outgrowth of sectarian movements. The manifestation of such changes were again evident in the persona of Muhammed, this time immediately after the Meccan period. Rather than aspiring to be solely a religious leader and to forsake other worldly prizes, Muhammed became a Prophet, Warrior, and King. He, in fact, became the ultimate charismatic claiming extraordinary power in three domains - religious, military and political. Muhammed

²⁸Cited in Ibid, p. 95.

²⁹Cristiano Grottanelli, "Archaic Forms of Rebellion and their Religious Background," Religion, Rebellion, and Revolution: An interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collection of essays, ed. Bruce Lincoln, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 28.

³⁰Ibid, pp. 28-29.

enjoined mundane aspirations with spiritual faith in the hope that it would unite disparate Arab tribes into one community. Islam therefore became not just a religion but a means toward an authoritative lifestyle and an all inclusive social force. With this newfound unified power soon came personal and tribal greed and after Muhammed's death the seeds for Islamic sectarianism were not only planted but they began to blossom.

The immediate successors to the Prophet Muhammed, the first four caliphs, set out to proselytize the word of *Allah* to all Arabs as well as to their former enemies - the Persians, Egyptians, and Syrians. They also adhered to the Prophet's dictum of conversion through conquest and intermarriage. However, Muhammed's own community remained divided over how succession to His office would be decided. Some declared that it should be a dynastic office remaining within the Prophet's family. Others felt that the successor should be chosen from amongst the community thus enabling other tribes a chance for a future share of power. The argument was allowed to rage on throughout this period as evidenced by three of the first four caliphs being assassinated by contending claimants to the office.³¹ The caliphate assassinations had two important effects on the Islamic community. First, they signalled a continuing and unresolved dispute over succession to the Prophet. Second and most important, they provided the Islamic

³¹Omar, the second caliph, was assassinated in 644. The third caliph - Uthman, chosen by a body of electors, was infamous for his nepotistic tendencies in doling out communal favors. He in turn was assassinated in 656. The fourth caliph, Ali, was the first successor to the Prophet that came from within His own clan. Ali's succession was immediately disputed by among other sects, the Kharajites, who demanded his removal. The dispute led to a revolt by Muawiya, a clansman of Uthman. Ali was eventually assassinated by a Kharajite in 661 CE. For a brief history of the early caliphate see Langer, pp. 199-202.

community with a fresh, first hand account of violent sacrifice and death in the Judeo-Christian mold. These two effects would account for the subsequent split of Islam into its two great factions - the Sunni and the Shi'a - and the great militant martyred exemplar of Shi'ism, Husayn.

After the fourth Caliph Ali was assassinated, Muawiya succeeded him despite Ali's son Hasan's election to the office. Hasan subsequently abdicated in favor of Muawiya. Before he died in 680, Muawiya declared that Yazid, his son, would follow him in the Caliphate. Succession by this time was still a festering sore in the hearts and minds of the Islamic community. When Muawiya failed to live up to either of the two predominant expectations for succession, tensions exploded. Husayn, another grandson of the Prophet, was invited to take the office of the caliphate. Before he got to Mecca, Husayn and his army were deserted by the Meccans at Kerbela and here he was slain by Yazid's troops. Embraced as a Shi'ite symbol of heroism and religious sanctity, Husayn is commemorated yearly with a self flagellation ritual during the month of Muharrem.

Husayn's martyrdom so mobilized the Shi'ite community that it set the foundation for a new communal office - the Imamate. Dismissing years of pretentious successors to the caliphate, Shi'as were finally empowered to worship and follow the Prophet's line of descendency. Although now more politically mobilized, the Shi'as had to become more quietest to ensure their survival under Yazid and his line.³² This, however, did not ensure peace and tranquility within their community. Soon thereafter Shi'ites suffered renewed

³²Nikki R. Keddie, "Shi'ism and Revolution," Religion, Rebellion, and Revolution, ed. Bruce Lincoln, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 159-160.

attacks against their community. The Imams were themselves subjected to tortuous death and persecution by other Muslims, thereby mimicking the generational pattern of martyrdom forged first by Judaism and then Christianity. Nevertheless, in death Husayn achieved for the Shi'ite community political self determination and religious autonomy.

Thus, martyrs within the period of Sectarian and Communal Faiths can be characterized as follows: 1) Increasingly, martyrs became symbols of exclusion, being embraced by tribal and ethnic clans as a personified representation of their nations; 2) Once nationalistic themes concerning martyrdom became commonplace, the essence of the image took a sharp turn toward political militance; 3) Martyrdom was judged as a necessary element for the eventual success of a community's cause, as it was often followed by a concession from the contending authoritarian party; and 4) the example of the *paradigmatic martyr* continued to stir emulation and generational adoption throughout a number of sects. The former two characterizations represent a distinct shift from the unitarian phase. The latter two characterizations, however, remain consistent with the preceding phase of the martyr's service, especially within the realm of the millenarian expectation and what we may now call *consequential martyrs*.³³ The era of sectarian and communal faiths lasts to this day and these characterizations remain part of each sect's religious folklore. By the late eighteenth century, however, these movements had been

³³By this era it now becomes evident that a paradigmatic martyr paves the way, in all cases, for others to follow in his path. All three families of sects universally adopt "mass martyring" and the auspices of regenerative figures which invoke the image of the paradigmatic martyr. From this point on in the thesis I shall refer to these icons as consequential martyrs.

slowly superimposed by predominantly political ideologies. This new age, the era of secularization, would define still other roles for the martyr as a tool of persuasion.

C. THE SECULAR IDEOLOGIES

The new era of secularization proved to be almost paradoxical with regard to the martyr. Initiated by a land founded on religious faith, especially rooted in the Puritan sects, America was to catalyze an areligious and political path for other nations and disparate secular ideologies to follow for the next two centuries. God and church, although still very much a part of societies at large, were swallowed up by the rhetoric of the civic religion of politics. State governments acquired powers that had hitherto been held by authorities within national churches. This became true no matter what the civic faith in question - liberal democracy, socialism/communism, or fascism - and would hold the key to a foreboding change in the character and role of the secular martyrs. As such, this section addresses the onset of the secular age and its affect on martyrdom.

The American Revolution was truly the first to catalyze the new age of secularization. Overwhelmingly a nation of Protestants, America's founding fathers knew too well of past religious persecutions by monarchical overlords in Europe. These persecutions, in fact, provided the impetus for their forebears' exodus to America throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE. Thus, religious toleration and the rejection of a national church headed by a central authority became inherent and integral themes in the pending design for this new nation. To achieve these ends, America's elites proposed a unique system of governance - liberal democracy. Decidedly more egalitarian than any form of

government of its time, this system led to a slow but marked erosion of religious ideals. This was especially true in the character of martyrs throughout the age.

We should look no further than the penultimate martyr of the American Revolution - Nathan Hale. For his famous last request, "Give me liberty or give me death!" signalled a dramatic change in the martyr. Formerly a communal hero's sacrifice was pronounced in the name of God's salvation and redemption for a nation, appropriately defined by one religion or another. In the case of the martyred Hale's, however, religion mattered little. Instead it was overshadowed by the survival and independence of an American state.

Author Eyal Naveh notes:

The signers of the Declaration of Independence acknowledged their readiness for martyrdom when they pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to the cause of freedom. Many Americans believed that George Washington made immeasurable sacrifices for the cause of liberty when he suffered with the half-clothed, half frozen heroes at Valley Forge. Familiar with the general heritage of sacrifice and martyrdom, American authors, poets, preachers, and popular historians applied the title *martyr* to specific individuals. They thus strove to invest the American national experience with transcendent meaning and to strengthen the American national consciousness through solidarity with the sacrifice of a dead hero.³⁴

The expectation for America's utopia had been defined by words like "freedom," "liberty," and "solidarity." Egalitarian and unifying slogans such as "All men are created equal" and "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," had replaced exclusionary national ethnic chants. Also noticeable was that man was increasingly more responsible for his own "salvation" and "redemption." God's grace was now playing second fiddle to mankind's militancy.

³⁴Eyal Naveh, Crown of Thorns: Political Martyrdom in America from Abraham Lincoln to Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 3.

Almost two decades after the American experience, the seeds for liberal democracy were sown again, this time in France. While almost all American Revolutionists adhered to some religious higher calling, a rather large group of French Revolutionists rejected all forms of religion and began to preach an anti religion based upon "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."³⁵ Author Lynn Hunt notes:

...revolutionary language was nonetheless resolutely secular in content. As the battlelines with the church became clearer, as they did almost immediately, revolutionaries eliminated most positive references to Christianity from their vocabulary. This rejection of Christian or Catholic references was yet another way of announcing the revolutionary break with the French and European past. The new social contract needed no analogy to Biblical covenants; it was grounded in reason and the natural rights of man.³⁶

Lady Liberty replaced the Virgin Mary in the state seal. Hercules became the God-like Father of France in the pantheon of state monuments to the revolution. Churches throughout France were closed and the Cathedral at Notre Dame was reopened as the Temple of Reason.³⁷ It became readily apparent that although religion had no place in the revolution, it was not entirely discarded. Rituals, allegories, and symbols were still

³⁵Most notable among the anti religious elements within the new French Republic came from the Hebertist faction of the Jacobin societies. For a summary of their activities see Christopher Dawson, The Gods of Revolution, (New York: New York University Press, 1972), pp. 82-100.

³⁶Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), p. 28.

³⁷See Hunt, pp. 65-119 and Dawson, pp. 95-100.

present, but now they were dressed in purely secular motifs. This was also true with the revolution's martyrs.

The most famous martyr of French anti-clericalism was the Swiss philosopher, writer, and doctor Jean Paul Marat. An atheist, Marat "had preached the gospel of terror,"³⁸ while leading the Committee for Public Safety as a means to keep the state united and supreme. After Marat's 1793 assassination by a provincial patriot, Charlotte Corday, the anti-religious extremists - the *sansculottes* - declared him their patron saint. The manifestation of the martyr's paradox had now been fully realized. Never before in history had a self-professed and devout atheist been regarded as a sacred figure. Once purely a symbol of religion, the martyr had evolved into a pure symbol of totalitarian politics. Marat's example of martyrdom would signal a path for its adoption by the succeeding totalitarian ideologies of communism and fascism.

Communism, concocted by atheists Marx and Engels in the middle of the nineteenth century, made its first successful entrance into state politics in the 1917 Russian Revolution. It became apparent that communism, based upon the preeminence of scientific method and the rejection of any eschatological dogma of idealism, and martyrdom were to be incompatible concepts. Lenin, himself an atheist, ardently opposed any mention of religious themes in his revolutionary drive to power.³⁹ This communist rejection of

³⁸Dawson, p. 65.

³⁹To support this contention I present the following evidence. First, in his letters to Gorky, Lenin proclaimed that "the god of the god builders is no different than any other god; the belief in god is 'necrophilia'..." Another example of Lenin's disdain for religion and anything sacred including martyrs came from a story retold by A.G. Rashin. Lenin's wife Krupskaya reportedly told her husband "that some soldiers she had met on [her train] trip had

martyr images, however, was shortlived. In fact, it took less than two decades for communists to finally embrace martyrs as tools of political persuasion. The backdrop for this reversal of policy was the Spanish Civil War and its catalysts were the writers who covered the bloody conflict.

The failure of the Spanish Republic to effectively govern and maintain civility over its populace has been well documented by scholars for decades. Spanish Republican authorities were so weakened by internal ideological factionalism that the country was predestined for an external solution. In this case, the solution as defined by the international community was to ensure that one ideology above all others would survive in Spain. Americans and Britons were adamant over their support to maintain a democratic republic in Spain. European Leftists (Communists, Socialists, and Anarchists) were equally determined to provide Spain the opportunity for alternate forms of governance. Finally, Fascists in Germany and Italy, opposed to the spreading Communist threat, deemed it essential to support Franco's *pronunciamiento* in the hope that it would maintain a fascist flavor. The war thus became internationalized, as volunteers flocked to Spain to save the country from certain ideological menace. Naturally, these idealistic volunteers were followed by their native correspondents eager to report home from the war front.

been told by a priest that Bolsheviks were like the apostles, going to the people to bring light and truth. Lenin responded that the form of the simile was wrong but that its idea was true." See Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 22 and 69.

As the conflict grew it soon became obvious that the war would provide journalists, writers, and poets with an abundance of heroes. Every ideology in succession embraced a martyr in Spain,⁴⁰ eventually even the communists. On 13 December, 1936 the communists finally found theirs in the persona of German International Brigade Commissar Hans Beimler. His candidacy to martyrdom was a likely one. An escaped prisoner from Dachau Prison in Germany, Beimler had previously been subjected to Nazi persecution, after once serving as an elected communist member to the Reichstag. In Spain, however, he became chief political officer for the International Brigades and was killed in battle at Madrid. After his death, his martyrdom was commemorated in song for his communist comrades to sing before battle.⁴¹ Communists, and leftists in general, had finally come to embrace martyrs. Their value as a symbol for organizational unity was hard to ignore. This pattern would spread to the Americas and throughout the international community as evidenced by the now famous international revolutionary martyr - Ernesto "Che" Guevara. While the path to martyrdom was initially hard to swallow for communists, it was easy medicine to take for fascists.

⁴⁰The martyrs of the Spanish Civil War represented the gamut of political ideologies present in the conflict. Rightist factions (Falangists, JONS, et al) claimed the assassinated José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the former Spanish dictator and the Falangist's founder, and Onésimo Redondo, who died in action at Alto de León; Monarchists claimed José Calvo Sotelo, allegedly murdered by Spanish Communists; Anarchists claimed Buenaventura Durruti, their leader killed in action in Madrid; *Pronunciamiento* officers loyal to Franco claimed Luis Guzmán Moscardó, son of the Colonel who waited out the siege of the Alcazar at Toledo. For a survey of these martyrs see the definitive work by Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 3-957.

⁴¹George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 191.

The power of martyrs was immediately recognized and martyrdom was embraced early on by fascist ideologies.⁴² The Nazi rise to power in Germany, in fact, owed its successes in part to early and effective propaganda campaigns using martyrs. The myth surrounding the fallen soldiers at Langemarck during the First World War is one such example.

Author Jay W. Baird notes:

Eleven thousand young men lie buried in the student cemetery at Langemarck, testifying to the depravity of war. Yet through propaganda and poetry their graves were rendered sacred shrines. They had not died; instead their souls had passed the earthly boundaries and had been transfigured. Their blood sacrifice had guaranteed the nation's future.... The image of the purity of the youth of Langemarck had an undeniable transcendent force.⁴³

Langemarck provided an effective allegory to validate the Nazi claim that struggle and war are the supreme activities in which man can participate.⁴⁴ Soldiers and hence war were thus easily glorified. The soldier-martyrs also proved to be reliable tools to further Hitler's strategy of divide and rule within his own army as Josef Goebbels ensured that each military organization could claim an archetypal martyr. The SA identified with its fallen songwriter Horst Wessel. Herbert Norkus - butchered by communist thugs - inspired the Hitler Youth organizations. Assassinated Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich served as a symbol for the SS. Finally, the Luftwaffe commemorated their

⁴²Ladislav Farago, et al, German Psychological Warfare, (New York: G.P Putnam and Sons, 1942), pp. 159-160.

⁴³Jay W. Baird, To Live and Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 4.

⁴⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), p. 91.

leading fallen ace, Colonel Werner Mölders.⁴⁵ Summarizing a German faith in their martyrs Reichsmarshal Herman Goring stated, "A nation with such heroes is assured of victory."⁴⁶

The secular age again redefined the role and character of martyrs. Overwhelmingly dressed in soldiers' uniforms, martyrs continued along a decidedly, if not wholly, political and militant path. Once a symbol that represented the expectation of God's intercession, it now signified the expectation of a man-made utopia on earth. This utopia would be particularly noted for its egalitarianism. The expanse of secular ideologies used martyrs in one or more ways. These included the use of martyrs: 1) as unifying agents for their states, 2) as international political agents to further their cause across state borders, or 3) as unifying forces for sub-national, organizational entities. Paradigmatic martyrs, while still providing for the initial catalyst for others to follow began to lose their primacy as propaganda campaigns boasted of quantities of fallen martyrs and tended to overlook the quality of one particular exemplar sacrifice. What remained a constant during this age, however, was the continued increase of their use across a wide spectrum of nations.

The final phase of martyrdom - a slow transition from the age of secularism - which we find ourselves in today, is the age of revolutionary faiths and religious fundamentalism. Liberal democracy has reigned supreme during and after the ideological battlegrounds of World War II and the Cold War. Nations disappointed by experiments in fascist, communist, and socialist governments have subsequently undergone a loss of

⁴⁵For a more complete survey of Nazi martyrs see Baird, pp. 1-245.

⁴⁶Cited in Ibid, p. 228.

ideological faith, identity, and worth.⁴⁷ These nations have now been forced to either acquiesce to democracy or find alternative ideologies, either through creation or adoption of pre-existing faiths. The trend, especially amongst Third World countries, is to either re-embrace primordial governance defined centuries ago by religion and communal identity or to adopt a new revolutionary faith. It is this phenomenon that sets the course for contemporary martyrs.

D. THE REVOLUTIONARY FAITHS AND FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIONS

Since we find ourselves in a transition from the age of secularism, the number of martyr cases for analysis remains somewhat more limited than those of past phases. What is certain, however, is that martyrs in today's age follow one of two paths - one reborn, the other synthesized. The former path describes a renewal of faiths whose original goals enjoined both political and religious goals. Most notable among these are the extremist factions from sectarian movements, especially from Shi'ite groups, orthodox Jewish sects, and even Christian cults. The latter path describes one that until just recently had not existed before. Joining tenets of socialism and communism with religion this ideology prescribes armed struggle and pastoral consecration as a remedy against reactionary and oppressive social systems. Known as Liberation Theology, it has been embraced by a number of radical priests in Latin America for the past thirty years. These two paths would forge yet another direction for martyrs and their roles in society.

⁴⁷I want to stress that I am including the disappointment and rejection of these ideologies by the former colonies of these nations as well.

Fundamentalist religious movements have become the recent villain in a western democratic campaign to find new national and international enemies since the fall of the "red menace." While most sectarian movements, labelled as fundamentalist, are peaceable, there exist factions which have pursued campaigns of terror to achieve both political and religious goals. It is these groups that receive much of the media attention throughout the western world and it is from them that we find our most recent cases of martyrdom. One such breeding ground for these images has been the on-going anti-confessional struggle in Lebanon.

A country torn apart by violence, Lebanon has suffered through an on-again, off-again civil war since 1975. The struggle for power became even more complicated as old religious divisions grew into new political divisions. This caught once united sectarian communities in the middle as contending parties competed for their essential bases of support. One such competition used mass martyring strategies as a means to validate and legitimate political movements and attract notice from a community already entranced with martyr worship - the Lebanese Shi'ites. The Shi'ite Hezbollah and Amal movements used martyrs as tools to gain political and religious authority from their constituency, yet their operations devolved quickly into sacrificial competition. Author Martin Kramer states:

Not only did these operations drive away the foreign enemies of Lebanon's Shi'ites; they also served to forestall the outbreak of fratricidal violence from within. The competitive cycle of sacrifice, done in the name of Islam, averted a competitive cycle

among adherents of Islam. When this sacrificial cycle collapsed, the violence turned inward upon Lebanon's, in the form of a fratricidal war.⁴⁸

Kramer attributes the breakdown in the sacrificial cycle to the issuance of a Shi'a clerical ban on martyrdom. This ruling restricted martyrdom unless it "[could] be carried out ... [to] bring about a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb."⁴⁹ This left Hezbollah and Amal without an outlet for rivalry. Soon mass martyrdom was followed by sectarian fratricide as Hezbollah and Amal turned on each other in the summer of 1988.⁵⁰ Martyrs, while effective as mobilization weapons against an enemy, also proved to be de-stabilizing agents and caused the creation of new enemies.

Liberation Theology, our second contemporary ideological proving ground for martyrs, offers a number of cases for analysis. The earliest and probably most famous of these is Father Camilo Torres, revolutionary radical priest from Colombia. His example remains the best to examine due to his prolific literary works. Guenter Lewy provides a telling summary of Torres' beliefs:

In another editorial, *Message to the Communists*, of September 2 [1965], Torres sought to clarify his relationship to the Communist Party, a participant in the United Front. I am a revolutionary Torres declared, and because 'the Communist Party has elements that are authentically revolutionary... I cannot, either as a Colombian, or as a socialist, or as a Christian, or as a priest, be anti-Communist.' I will not join their ranks, but 'I am ready to fight alongside them for common goals: opposing the oligarchy and the domination of the United States, in order to take power for the popular class.' Pope

⁴⁸Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon," Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, (Autumn 1991), p. 31.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 43.

⁵⁰Ibid, pp. 44-45.

John had authorized such collaboration, and 'the example of Poland shows us that Socialism can be built without destroying the essentials of Christianity.'⁵¹

Torres was killed during a guerrilla ambush on a Colombian Army patrol on 15 February 1966. "For some Colombian Catholics," as well as other Latin American priests, "Torres [is] a martyr" that represents a struggle against western imperialism, native oppressive regimes, "and the clerical establishment."⁵²

Decidedly militant, martyrs in this new age of Revolutionary Religion and Religious Fundamentalism have rediscovered elements of religious orientation. In the case of the Fundamentalists we have seen an overwhelming tendency to adopt the martyr as a symbol of mass violence and terrorism.⁵³ So much so that the image has had a debilitating effect upon the movement which embraces it. In the case of Liberation Theology, martyrs have remained as less spectacular symbols but reincorporating the religious aura with increasingly representation by a number of radical clerics. Although the impact has apparently waned in those countries that once embraced them wholeheartedly, liberation theology continues to be practiced throughout Latin America. It is my contention that

⁵¹Camilo Torres as cited in Guenter Lewy, p. 524.

⁵²Ibid, p. 525.


⁵³This pattern follows closely the mass suicide operations of the Jewish Zealots at Masada and the Christian Circumcelliones in Africa, as evidenced by the Jonestown Massacre in Guyana and the Branch Dravidian Raid in Texas. It also includes, however, recent mass slaughters conducted by fervent followers of particular extremist groups against other religious groups [to wit. the recent Mosque massacre of Arab palestinians in the Occupied Territories in Israel]. In both cases, the level of violence and resultant deaths have been spectacularly grotesque.

although the martyr's path remains to be placed in its proper focus of late, it will continue along one of these newfound paths in the immediate future.

E. SUMMARY

Martyrs are a rather recent creation within the history of mankind. First conceived and utilized by the unitarian faiths as symbols to unite and reward conformity, they were universally passive and ascetic ascribing to an other worldly calling. Once martyrs became synonymous with ethnic or sectarian groups, they began to acquire a political and militant character, as various groups laid claim to their particular patron saint. During this age martyrs became exclusive symbols. They also represented an unrelenting faith in the expectation of religious salvation and political autonomy. This trend continued until virtually all auspices of religious affiliation and association previously maintained by the martyr were abolished in the secular age of politics. Secular martyrs retained the belief that an expected utopia would be bestowed upon his followers, but clearly defined in purely political terms such as equality, freedom, and liberty. Finally, in today's world martyrs have re-embraced a religious aura - either by falling back on age old sectarian faiths or by constructing a revised ideology based on religious and contemporary political ideologies. Each phase along the martyr's historical life has been defined by a number of paradigmatic exemplar only to be followed by a substantial number of followers establishing a generational pattern. In any case, the martyr's political and militant use has increased drastically and its passive and ascetic nature has eroded. An illustration tracing the evolution of the martyr's character is shown on the next page in Figure 1.

FIGURE - 1



F. CONCLUSIONS

The martyr's path for the last two centuries has been overwhelmingly politicized and decidedly militant. Nothing suggests that this course will change. While there have been recent exceptional cases of passive martyrs, such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Ghandi, even these figures maintained largely political views rather than a withdrawn course for their community's causes. It becomes readily apparent that although religious overtones have reshaped the martyr's character, the specter of ethnic divisions so widespread in today's world will force this symbol to regain an exclusive nature. This exclusivity will necessarily propel it into symbolizing armed struggle much as it did during the era of sectarian movements and communal faiths. In this regard, martyrs will

continue to retain their powerful ability to awaken social consciousness, entrance populations to support one cause or another, and stir countless numbers toward violence.

III. THE MARTYR'S CONSTRUCT

When commenting on political movements in armed struggles with authorities, Richard E. Rubinstein states that, "A [revolutionary] movement needs martyrs as well as victors; sooner or later, one's daring sacrificial deeds will inspire a mass revolt." After surveying the lot of revolutionary movements since the end of the eighteenth century, it is evident that Rubinstein's claim is somewhat boastful and exaggerated. Not every revolutionary movement has embraced martyrs as inspirational symbols. In fact, martyrs have been largely absent in some of the most successful revolutions throughout history. What can be said, however, is that all revolutions provide a conditional environment for the adoption of personified symbols of reverence and emulation. Included in this family of revolutionary symbols are heroes and patriots. Not surprisingly, those revolutions which remained martyr-less relied instead upon these latter, more common symbols of honor to attract notice to their cause and mobilize support.

Immediately a number of questions arise from these assertions. First, what makes a revolutionary martyr different from patriots or a heroes in armed political struggles? And second, what are the conditions prevalent in all revolutions that contribute to the creation of this family of symbols? To answer these questions I have surveyed and examined the vast literature published concerning political symbol theory and treatises on revolution. Next I sought to synthesize elements of these theories to help explain the presence or absence of martyrs in revolution. What results is an in-depth analysis of the creation of

revolutionary martyrs, spanning the spectrum of political ideologies and religious faiths.

This chapter uses a contingency argument¹ to help illustrate those conditions which contribute to the creation of personified symbols in revolution. I have categorized these conditions into one of two areas - necessary and sufficient. Necessary conditions are those which are common to the creation of all three personified symbols in revolution. These conditions explain the social environment, particular events, and social elements which are necessary to stimulate certain cognitive impulses in the human psyche to create symbols. Once created they also give rise their incorporation in the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, sufficient conditions provide the "critical mass" for the creation of the martyr alone. These conditions which I will also refer to as the *Sacred "X" Factors*, also explain why martyrs are inherently more powerful symbols than heroes and patriots. Finally, I will offer two cases for study and analysis. The first case - the Russian Revolution - will be used to explain and account for the absence of martyrs in revolutionary movements. The latter case - the Spanish Civil War - will help explain the presence of a multitude of martyrs in revolution. Let us now set out on our course.

A. NECESSARY CONDITIONS

The first necessary condition for the creation of heroes, patriots and martyrs in revolution is what I shall term *social ebullience*. Within this environment institutions

¹I assert that this argument is based on a number of contingencies inherent within society. The revolutionary martyr's construct is therefore dependent upon social conditions, the actions that social groups party to the revolution decide to take, specific events, and the cultural value systems that impinge upon contingencies. For a more thorough overview of this distinctive type of theory see Johnson, pp. 169-194.

once responsible and adept at overseeing the maintenance of civility and order, such as governments, schools, and organized religions, are now entirely incapable of handling these responsibilities. What exists instead is a society in chaos, imploding upon itself.

Mircea Eliade writes:

The destruction of an established order, the abolition of an archetypal image, was equivalent to a regression into chaos, into the pre-formal, undifferentiated state that preceded the cosmogony. Let us note that the same images are still invoked in our own days when people want to formulate the dangers that menace a certain type of civilization: there is much talk of 'chaos', of 'disorder,' of the 'dark ages' into which 'our world' is subsiding. All these expressions, signify the abolition of an order, of a Cosmos, of a structure, and the re-immersion of a state that is fluid, amorphous, in the end chaotic.²

Whatever causes can be attributed to this condition, chaos "incapacitate[s] the routine institutional procedures and arrangements of a system for self-maintenance"³ including those which secure meaning to social values and meanings.

But social ebullience encompasses more than this. The formerly recognized social groupings which had at one time participated within the old order - political parties, denominational faiths, civic organizations, etc. - are themselves disintegrating into newly formed and competing entities. This uncontrolled social decay inevitably leads to a "chronic state of threat."⁴ Conservative social groups who had remained content with the existing status and power relationships perceive that these new groupings threaten the continued existence of the established authority. Likewise new contending groups feel

²Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, trans.Philip Mairet, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 38.

³Johnson, p. 73.

⁴Kenneth Jowitt, "Charisma,"lecture delivered to the students of the National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 19 August 1993.

threatened by their lack of influence upon the now weakened social system.⁵ The perception of threats, if left without resolution, naturally devolves into the adoption and rationalization of violence by groups within the social system to establish order.⁶ Social psychologist, Rene Girard characterizes this phenomenon as reciprocal violence, where "violence roams at will, unchallenged and unchecked...."⁷ Thus, the barbarous tactics which we so readily associate with rival groups contending for power in revolution, are the natural end state of *social ebullience*.

The next necessary condition for the adoption of heroes, patriots and martyrs in revolution is what shall be termed the *personified object of rivalry*. This condition closely follows *social ebullience* in that it is directly dependent upon a number of contingencies stemming from the social environment. First, two or more inanimate entities, such as political parties or religious orders, must participate in a clearly recognized and violent struggle for the same prize. In revolution this usually encompasses land, governance, or the exercise of particular rights. During this struggle one or the other entity will always be characterized as either the "side of tyranny" or "the side of the oppressed."⁸ Next,

⁵Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence, (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 24-30.

⁶Ibid, p. 24.

⁷Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), p. 143.

⁸Ibid, p. 149.

there also must be some singular act⁹ which displays this rivalry - one agent of the "oppressed" must in some manner suffer adversity at the hands of the tyrannical power. Therefore, both parties are in some way responsible for and contribute to the aura of this rivalry. Still only an event up to this point, the rivalry takes on symbolic form due to socio-psychological impulses.

The *personified object of rivalry* depends upon the cognitive processes of the human mind which create the impetus behind the creation of new symbols. Authors Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb explain:

New symbols are created when people find available symbols inadequate to capture or give expression to their experiences, feelings or beliefs. This is likely to occur in the face of dramatic events or major changes in the natural, social, or political environment. In such circumstances, a symbol may emerge more or less spontaneously from the facts of the situation.¹⁰

The prevalent, uncontrolled violence that contributed to chaos and was responsible for undermining the previous order of social values and meanings has now created a catalytic event to transpose new meaning to elements within society. The *personified object of rivalry* therefore provides a common referent for shared information, values, and anxieties. It also offers a singular and simplified experience which summarizes and condenses the

⁹The Nazi SS were masters at preventing the creation of martyrs and heroes by incorporating mass punishment and execution. See Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1978), pp. 72-73. In this passage, Moore describes the calculated schemes that SS prison guards used toward this end. "If a prisoner tried to protect others and it came to the guard's attention, the prisoner was usually killed. But if his action came to the knowledge of the camp administration, the whole group was always punished severely. In this way the group came to resent its protector because he brought them suffering."

¹⁰Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, The Political Uses of Symbols, (New York: Longman, 1983), p. 30.

complex surroundings during revolutions to enable continued communication within groups.¹¹

The tendency of groups to adopt personified symbols to explain the complexities surrounding them is common throughout history. One such example of this tendency was an early reference to the state in world politics. Michael Walzer explains:

The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived. An image like the *body politic*, then is not simply a decorative metaphor, applied by a writer who has already grasped the nature of political association and now wishes to felicitously to convey his understanding. Rather, the image is prior to understanding or, at any rate, to theoretic understanding, as it is to articulation, and necessary to both."¹²

During revolution, the affirmation of social identities and self worth is constantly challenged.¹³ The personification of symbols is therefore a primordial attempt to restore these lost identities and rebuild social value. Hence, it follows that heroes, patriots, and martyrs, are not only natural and appropriate symbols that are created to describe the inherent rivalries found in revolution. They are also agents of restoration for a collective identity. Having actually participated in the struggle, these personified symbols are first-hand and logical choices for all societies to turn to create order from cognitive disorder.

The last necessary condition for the creation of heroes, patriots, and martyrs is an *audience*. *Audiences* communicate, explain, and expound upon these symbols by accounting for and retelling the incidents surrounding the example of a particular

¹¹Ibid, p. 31.

¹²Michael Walzer, "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought," Political Science Quarterly, 82 (Summer 1967), p. 194.

¹³Ibid, p. 32.

individual. Obviously, if there is no audience, there can be no hero, patriot, or martyr. It is my contention, however, that there exists two types of *audiences* - one *real* and one *created*. The first type, the *real audience*, is one which is actually present to witness the acts of heroism, patriotism, and martyrdom which are responsible for the creation of their symbols. The second type, the *created audience*, is somewhat less understood and more difficult to explain. I will, however, use a familiar theoretical puzzle involving a falling tree in the forest to help illustrate my contention.

The puzzle, as it has been posed countless times, is simply: "Does a tree that falls in the forest, without the benefit of one to hear it, make a sound?" Respondents are traditionally divided into two camps - one affirming the existence of sound, the other denying it. The latter camp takes a rather mathematical approach to the puzzle. They explain that sound is a product of two variables - an originator and a receptor. The absence of one or the other, they believe, degrades the process into one of non-existence. The former camp, which I support, adheres to theoretical logic. We know that trees exist virtually everywhere. We also know that from time to time they fall. Some of us have even witnessed the crash of a tree falling to the ground. Thus, by mere suggestion of a fallen tree, we can stimulate an audience to imagine the sound such a crash would make.

We can easily draw a parallel from the fallen tree in the puzzle and personified symbols. Social groups know that heroes, patriots, and martyrs exist, especially within revolutions. They are also well aware and familiar with the violence that begets death and injury. Thus, it does not take a great leap of faith to imagine the conditions surrounding the death of an individual after a suggestion of those circumstances has been

publicized. Once a suggestion of heroism, patriotism, or martyrdom has been made, the impetus behind personified symbol creation can and has been set in motion. This is not to imply that suggestion is as powerful as reality. If an audience has been created by suggestion and association, it is more likely to require additional substantiation if the original allegations have been challenged. *Created audiences*, therefore require constant manipulation. Given this manipulation, *created audiences* for personified symbols can be just as effective as one which is *real*.

In review, the necessary conditions for the construction of heroes, patriots and martyrs in revolution are closely analogous to symbol formation processes. *Social ebullience*, a term used to describe the chaos, violence and rivalry prevalent in revolutions, is responsible for collective cognitive dissonance. During this social decay, existing values and symbols no longer adequately explain the nature of social interaction. Hence, there exists a need for the creation of new symbols. Using psychological theory and historical cases, we have shown that *personified objects of rivalry* are overwhelmingly popular choices for new symbols within revolutionary societies. These personified symbols provide a singular, momentous event - a reference point - that summarizes and condenses social chaos and affords greater understanding to the collective consciousness. Finally, *audiences* act as conductors for the transposition of meaning to these new personified symbols and they serve as the key communicative element.

B. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS - *THE SACRED "X" FACTORS*

Up to this point in the chapter, I have described the social environment, particular events, and social elements which account for the creation of personified symbols in revolution. Although historically used as synonymous terms and serving similar purposes - heroes, patriots, and martyrs - are, in fact, disparate symbols. Martyrs stand alone from the other two personified symbols in revolution, in that they are responsible for the construction of what I have previously labelled *paradigmatic truth*.¹⁴

Most political symbolism theorists generally agree that there exists a vertical hierarchy of symbols with some standing out as more powerful than others.¹⁵ Author Murray Edelman explains that symbols:

that purport to deal with first causes of future developments and therefore are least susceptible to empirical verification are (1) at the top of the hierarchy, (2) most directly associated with the emotions of fear, anger, dominance, and submission, and (3) associated with a reference group patterning such that conformity to the dominant cognitions (rather than success in action) is rewarded and lack of conformity is punished.¹⁶

All martyrs meet these criteria. Firstly, we have previously established that martyrs, particularly those in revolution, help manifest and induce a millenarian expectation within

¹⁴It is important to note here that I am avoiding the use of a predominant term - myth - used most frequently in the literature of sociology. Myth is a value laden term in that it roughly equates to a reference of a false, unfounded, or empirically unproven story. A paradigmatic truth is in fact a charter for the construction of a social reality and is regarded by its believers as an unwavering force. It represents truth, credibility, and legitimate authority. See Lincoln, pp. 23-25.

¹⁵Among these theorists are Cobb and Elder, pp. 38-40; Edelman, pp. 41-44; and Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, (September, 1960), p. 556.

¹⁶Edelman, p. 42.

their communities. Secondly, we have also recognized that martyrs embody an aura of persecution which invokes strong emotive, often sympathetic, sentiments. Finally, this sympathy, while not always honored or revered, can at least be respected. When comparing the same criteria to patriots and heroes in revolution, it becomes obvious that as a collective body these figures don't adhere to the apex of the hierarchy, in absolute terms. Furthermore, Murray argues that those symbols that embrace "a divinely willed or inevitable status and of close attachment to a movement that is just and destined to succeed in exterminating evil"¹⁷ are those most likely singled out from all others in this hierarchy.

Revolutionary martyrs, even when used in a secular sense, are sacrosanct figures. Originally, merely witnesses to God's grace, martyrs rose to be regarded as first among a messiah's followers. They were conceived to be extraordinary beings which possessed extraordinary powers. These powers included a vision for redemption and a special influence with a higher authority that would intercede on behalf of one group to help sustain, if not sway their struggle toward victory. Heroes and patriots, on the otherhand, are ordinary beings who perform extraordinarily well in given situations. They are susceptible to human frailty and weaknesses and they often fall from grace.¹⁸ Thus,

¹⁷Ibid, p. 42.

¹⁸To provide an example of this distinction, Eyal J. Naveh argues effectively that President John Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were exceptional candidates for martyrdom during America's revolution-like atmosphere of the 1960s. However, only King retained that honor. Subsequently undermined by the country's role Vietnam, his family's aristocratic lifestyle, and reported moral improprieties, after death Kennedy was left as something of "a controversial hero and had certainly not turned into an enduring martyr." Naveh, p. 176.

martyrs maintain a supernatural specter of holiness or even in the purest secular sense - a divine righteousness - that has always been beyond reproach and is held as paradigmatically true.

Why, then, don't all revolutions incorporate martyrs as propaganda tools? This question poses an even greater dilemma in light of the premises established in the previous chapter. These were: 1) All revolutionary movements have one important, intrinsic commonality - a millenarian expectation;¹⁹ 2) Western society, in the tradition of the monotheistic faiths, first characterized the concept of a millenarian expectation with the coming of a messiah; and 3) It was the messianic figure that served as the foundational basis for the martyr. Many scholars have, therefore, purported that martyrs are exclusive only to those cultures imbued with a tradition of monotheistic beliefs, particularly Christianity.²⁰

At the surface, this belief retains a substantial degree of plausibility. The vast majority of martyrs are conceived from those cultures firmly embedded with Judaic, Christian, or Islamic traditions. However, a more thorough examination of revolutionary martyrs renders the former assertion as a somewhat oversimplified explanation. Mao Tse Tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Revolution, was neither Jew, nor Christian, nor

¹⁹John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political phenomenon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 15-18. In this passage he describes revolutionary movements as analogous to modern millenarian movements in that they are "so Utopian as to be quite aptly characterized as millenarian."

²⁰Among them Rapoport; Vytautas Kavolis, "Models of Rebellion,"; Richard C. Martin, "The Study of Religion and Violence," in The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, ed. Rapoport and Alexander, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 3-42, 43-61, 127-132, 349-373; and Naveh, p. 1.

Muslim, but still he martyred his fallen comrades with a monument in Tiananmen Square to those who died in the Long March. Likewise, today in Sri Lanka, the predominantly Hindu Tamil Tigers have also adopted martyrs.²¹

I therefore argue that martyrs in revolution are not exclusive to nations bound to monotheistic beliefs and value systems. Rather martyrs are apt to appear in those cultures that have been formerly conditioned by some messianic movement. In all cases where revolutionary martyrs appear in predominantly non-monotheistic cultures, there existed some previous, recognizable messianic source injected into that culture. Therefore, the adoption of revolutionary martyrs are contingent upon some form of *messianic cultural conditioning*.²² To help illustrate this term let's use the previously mentioned two cases where martyrs were used during eastern revolutions - Mao's Communist Revolution and the ongoing Sri Lankan Revolution.

In the first instance, the conceptual basis for Mao's revolutionary martyrs can be traced to a brutal peasant uprising which lasted from 1851-1864 CE in China. The Taiping Rebellion, as it is known, claimed some 20 million Chinese during its fourteen

²¹In a recent political pamphlet published by the Tamil Tigers, the organization mentions two of its most famous martyrs - Arulnathan and Lieutenant Aseer. See A.S. Balasingham, "Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle," Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Publication Number 4, 1983, p. 34.

²²It is prudent at this point in the thesis to distinguish millenarianism and messianism. Millenarianism is the belief in the coming Millenium and as stated earlier in this paper has been adopted by all secular revolutionary ideologies. Messianism, however, is the belief that a divine human figure, the Messiah, will come to lead a community toward the Millenium. The distinction, although subtle, centers around necessity of one individual's extraordinary and supernatural powers to enact the miraculous.

years.²³ Driven by promises of agrarian reform and achieving momentum by mobilizing a massive peasant army, the Taiping Rebellion has been characterized as the antecedent to the Communist Revolution.²⁴ More importantly, however, it set the seeds for a messianic conditioning in China and hence the adoption of martyrs by the Chinese Communists. Author Crisitiano Grottanelli notes that Baptist preachers from the United States were responsible for the millenarian expectation and messianic nature of the Taiping Rebellion.²⁵ Led by a converted Chinese Baptist named Hung Hsiu-ch'uaun, millions of Hakka and Miao clans from southern China formed the first armies of the Taipings. The Taipings, believing their leader Hung was the younger brother of Jesus Christ,²⁶ fought valiantly in scores of battles throughout China. The subsequent martyr-like fate of Hung was sealed when he met an early death by committing suicide after his final defeat in battle. Thus, it is my contention that the martyrs from the Chinese Revolution, while clearly not emanating from a monotheistic culture, resulted from the messianic cultural conditioning of the Taipings.

Like the Chinese Revolution, the adoption of revolutionary martyrs in Sri Lanka, particularly by the Tamil Eelam Tigers, has been contingent upon previous conditioning

²³Dunn, p. 80.

²⁴Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.15-17.

²⁵Grottanelli, pp. 31-32.

²⁶It is also believed that Hung contributed to the belief that he was a messiah. His frequent epileptic seizures convinced millions of his peasant followers that he was being touched by God. For an account of his unusual behavior see Johnson, "Revolutionary Change,"pp. 80-81.

by messianic ideologies external to the country. In this case British Anglican priests were the responsible for conditioning the Tamils toward messianism and martyrs. Colonized by Portugal, Holland and Britain, Sri Lanka had been dominated by European colonial powers for more than four centuries. It was the British, however, that annexed two separate kingdoms - Tamil and Sinhala - to form the state of Sri Lanka. Ethnic and religious antagonism between the two former kingdoms solidified as the British provided the Hindu Tamils with a more than adequate share of power within the administration over the Buddhist Sinhala.²⁷ The Tamil elites, those who held the highest positions within the colonial state administration, were courted by the Anglican missionaries in the country and more than a few converted to Christianity.²⁸ It is my contention that this sparked the adoption of messianism and, in turn, martyrs by today's militant Tamils.

Messianic cultural conditioning, however, defies the prevailing logic concerning ethnic conflict. Both the Chinese and Sri Lankan Revolutions were rooted in nationalistic overtones. Hence, one might contend that ardent nationalist revolutionaries would be prone to reject any foreign influences. Again, I assert that this prevailing logic is also over-simplified. Let us look instead to social psychological theory for a better explanation of the phenomenon.

²⁷ As has been the case in most British colonies in Asia, certain ethnic groups were singled out to carry out administrative functions, while others were categorized into different occupational groupings. In this case, the Tamils were the obvious choice for the native administrative class in Sri Lanka, having immigrated from a previously colonized India and being more familiar with the British administration system. See Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), pp. 23-49.

²⁸ Balasingham, p. 7.

One theory first put forth by author René Girard - mimetic desire - sought to account for the perpetual rituals of sacrifice and other forms of religious violence throughout primitive and modern cultures. But it also clearly explains the recent urge of non-monotheistic cultures to incorporate martyrs within their revolutionary struggles. Mimetic desire describes man's innate drive to obtain the same objects or desires as his rival. The ever competitive Mao not only sought for the unification of his nation under communism but he strove to shake off the domination of outside powers and show to the world that China had finally come of age as a nation. What better way to join the club of elite nations than to sport its own martyred icons just as the French, English and Americans had nearly two centuries before?

Similarly, it is my contention that the Tamils are pursuing much the same course as had the Chinese Communists. The Tiger martyrs are just as important to the Hindu Tamils as Anglican martyrs had been for the British. They are in fact communal badges of identification which legitimate a nation striving for independence and recognition, equating to if not rivalling the status of the United Kingdom as a sovereign. Whether rooted to Hinduism or not, the martyrs of the Tamil Tigers are a desired prize that these revolutionaries are not easily willing to give up.

The last sufficient condition for the creation of martyrs is termed the *associational catalyst*. This term refers to the metaphorical suggestions and assertions, whether subtle or overt, that elevate the martyr to a central, preeminent, and easily recognizable symbols. Usually originating from the poet's pen, the writer's romantic story or the journalist's

column,²⁹ the *associational catalyst* "provides the pattern of perception to which people respond"³⁰ and contribute to the power of the symbol.

Associational catalysts, themselves a metaphor invoking the image of chemical reactions, are dependent upon certain conducive conditions. It is one thing to suggest that a hero or a patriot is a martyr, it is quite another for a community to perceive it as true. Therefore, the metaphor inherent in *associational catalysts* requires that its author must maintain a degree of social legitimacy so as to invoke a believable image. This can be increasingly difficult in revolution, as institutions are questioned, but not impossible. Next, there must be some media access (printing presses, radio, television, posters, etc.) to ensure the continuation of the metaphor. As authorities clamp down on revolutionary agents and their propaganda, this may again pose problems. However, even word of mouth can spread a metaphor, so it is near impossible for an authority to entirely shut down the media access necessary for associational catalysts.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS


Up to this point I have analyzed martyrs using a contingency approach - that is to say we have determined that its image is dependent upon both necessary and sufficient conditions. From this perspective, I have shown that martyrs, like heroes and patriots, are

²⁹I offer one particular example as evidence: During the Spanish Civil War, romantic poets, novelists, journalists, and even filmmakers created a panopoly of revolutionary martyrs. Most notable among these creative artists were W. H. Auden, Ernest Hemingway, C. Day Lewis, André Malraux, George Orwell, and Gustav Regler. See Frederick R. Benson, Writers in Arms: The Literary Impact of the Spanish Civil War, (New York: New York University Press, 1967), pp. 1-305.

³⁰Edelman, p. 67.

first dependent upon social ebullience, the socio-psychological impulse to personify symbols, and audiences to communicate their meaning. Next, we distinguished martyrs from their two cousins by concluding that the *Sacred "X" Factors* of cultural messianic conditioning and associational catalyst elevates them to positions of greater symbolic power. The figure below - Figure 2 - illustrates this argument.

FIGURE 2



This symbolic power is such that revolutionary martyrs cannot be subjected to empirical premises of disproof. Thus, they are more apt to be accepted as true even without substantive proof. As symbols they also "create," as Murray Edelman suggests, "valued self-conceptions and political roles that are highly resistant to incompatible or complicating information."³¹

³¹Edelman, p. 42.

IV. THE REVOLUTIONARY MARTYR'S PARADIGMATIC PROPORTIONALITY

George Bernard Shaw commented in his book, The Devil's Disciple, that: "Martyrdom ... [is] the only way a man can become famous without ability." Truly, over time many once-martyred revolutionaries are subsequently dismissed as mere failures. These martyrs lose the ability to incite emotive responses from previously loyal constituencies. Whether discredited by some previously unknown moral impropriety, failed by an all but extinct political ideology, or merely forgotten in a sea of fallen comrades, the individual symbol no longer serves as an effective tool of persuasion. Some lose their effectiveness almost overnight. Other revolutionary martyrs fade away within a generation or so. Such has definitely been the case with the Nazi pantheon of martyrs earlier this century. As soon as the victorious allied armies occupied Germany after World War II, most all traces of Nazi martyr memorials had been erased from the annals of German culture. However, still other martyrs in revolution never lose their powers to persuade individuals to support their political causes and adopt violence as a means to change society.

This leads us to explore one obvious question - How can we determine whether one movement's martyr will possess an effective ability to persuade others to adopt a revolutionary cause and incite action? Previously I maintained that revolutionary martyrs, constructs of the human psyche, are beyond the realm of empirical measurement. This is

not to say, however, that through analytical comparison we can not uncover one martyr's proportional strength over another. In the pages that follow, I assert that a revolutionary martyr's effective strength is dependent upon two factors. First, socio-political groups must be able to pattern a martyr's sacrifice within the confines of a socially devised charter of reality - a *paradigmatic truth*. These *paradigmatic truths*, especially as they relate to martyrs, must be constructed along three social dimensions - *truth perception, credibility and legitimate authority*.¹ In succession, each dimension relates to and effects the believability, plausibility, and preexisting social identities and sentiments.² As each social dimension is increased, the greater the likelihood that the revolutionary martyr's symbol will be accepted as truthful. When, however, each social dimension is maximized, the martyr becomes a symbol beyond reproach and is accepted as an ultimate reality.

Once revolutionary martyrs attain the status of a social paradigm, their images become powerful symbols which catalyze zealous action. Moreover, revolutionary martyrs can

¹In his definitive work on the subject of social realities, historian, sociologist, and author Bruce Lincoln, contends that myths are created in much the same manner. Most social myths follow a three dimension construction process of truth-claims, credibility, and authority. I have taken the academic liberty of modifying Lincoln's original model to accommodate for revolutionary martyrs as they become woven into a social group's charter of reality. See Lincoln, "Discourse," p. 23-26.

²U.S. Army doctrine has recognized the importance of exploiting pre-existing social beliefs and habits when planning psychological operations missions both for allies and against enemies. A recent U.S. Army publication advises psychological operators to "capitalize on existing habits" because target audiences "more readily believe and follow information and directives" that they have previously been accustomed to. U.S. Department of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 3-7.

become destabilizing elements if left uncontrolled.³ Thus, if they are to be truly effective revolutionary martyrs must be subjected to rigorous *bureaucratic controls*. These controls are most effective when fluctuating from strategies which avow action to alternate strategies which proclaim a more passive orientation. Action oriented strategies provoke individuals to act in the name of a fallen comrade, avenging his death against an authority. These strategies demand violent, aggressive behavior and often offer the promise of *consequential martyrdom*.⁴

But alone these strategies accomplish little more than organizational destruction, as hundreds or even thousands of revolutionaries, often ill-prepared and ill-trained, set out to challenge and confront the authority in power. Coupled, however, with somewhat more passive strategies to bolster recruitment and enhance socialization processes, such as the incorporation of ritualistic practices and ceremonies, martyrs can also compliment revolutionary political activities. These two differing strategies enable revolutionary groups sufficient freedom to manipulate martyrs throughout the course of their struggle. This organizational freedom can therefore create an unlimited set of options for the propagandist, which often forces the authority into a reactive and defensive posture.

These two factors - the construction of social dimensions for paradigmatic truths and

³For a brief illustration see my summary of the early Jewish martyrs in Chapter II. Also Mircea Eliade adds, "Martyrdom, a harbinger of an uprising, is also a temporary alternative to it. A community must control its martyrs as it controls its military zealots....The loss of such control among the Judean provincials during the latter part of the first century BCE was fatal for Jewish autonomy and nearly fatal for Jewry as a whole." Eliade, "Encyclopedia,"p. 235.

⁴Previously addressed in Chapter II; *Consequential martyrs* are usually the products of mass martyring operations.

bureaucratic controls - with regards to revolutionary martyrs help explain why some can endure the test of time and others fail. The following sections presented in this chapter explain each of these factors. In so doing we will examine three cases of revolutionary martyrs and describe how these factors were either ignored or embraced by the revolutionary movement. Finally, we will determine which martyr of the three was proportionally more effective than the others and why.

A. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PARADIGMATIC MARTYRS

The first dimension in the construction of a social paradigm - *truth perception* - concerns the initial inclination of a society to believe a claim as reliable or accurate. With regard to martyrdom, the manner surrounding a revolutionary's death provides us with an initial "litmus test" of *truth perception*. In particular, we should determine if the martyr is truly perceived as being a victim of a tyrannical power or whether his death is regarded as a concocted ploy to gain sympathy? Author Mircea Eliade writes that "a martyr is often a model for lesser forms of martyrdom ..." and that "suicide, being self inflicted, is rarely accepted ..." ⁵ Thus, if we were to develop a scale of *truth perception* at the lesser end would lie *suicide* and at the greater end would lie unjust *murder*. If society perceives that a martyred revolutionary was himself responsible for his own death, then his subsequent martyrdom will be degraded. If, however, society perceives that he was wrongfully tricked into his fateful end, his martyrdom will be esteemed and held up

⁵Eliade, "Encyclopedia," p. 231.

as "exemplary."⁶

The next dimension - *credibility* - concerns the social impulse of groups to embrace something as being highly plausible. In reference to martyrdom, *credibility* is established by how well one adheres to what I have labelled the "ideal revolutionary martyr profile."⁷

The first ideal characteristic involves the sex of the revolutionary martyr. In each and every revolutionary group which embraced martyrs as political tools of propaganda, the paradigmatic martyred exemplar was male.⁸ This should be of no surprise to sociological scholars. Truly, most martyrs are the products of western society and these societies are predominantly patriarchal. Hence, the martyred revolutionary serves as a father-figure, guiding his rebellious children toward a better future. Also, women just do not figure prominently in revolutionary organizations. Even in the most current revolutionary movements, those of the 1970s and beyond, women have comprised at most, thirty

⁶Ibid, p 231.

⁷After an in-depth study of 20 revolutionary martyrs, I constructed a database of the personal characteristics and social environment surrounding these martyrs. Using a multi variable deduction, nine variables in particular were chosen as the most influential in this sample. This data can be found in Appendix B, Table 2 - Revolutionary Martyrs: A Database.

⁸As with any rule, there are exceptions. I have discovered a recent paradoxical effort to create female revolutionary martyrs in the Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru. Among these are - Janet Talavera and Edith Lagos. Although Peru is divided along ethnic lines (European descendants, mestizos, and indians), each ethnic group retains a highly patriarchal social system. Indeed the impetus behind the creation of female martyrs is not coming from inside Peru. Rather, their suggestive catalysts, originating primarily from American and European Maoist supporters, have developed these female icons to engender support from the feminist communities in both the U.S. and in Europe. See Revolution in Peru, (Berkeley: The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, 1985, pp 24-27), "International Women's Day", a poster; Luis Arce Borja, "Janet is winning battles from beyond the grave," El Diario Internacional, May 1992, pp 89; "Janet Talavera continues to win battles long after her death", El Diario Internacional, May 1993, p 14.

percent of all members.⁹

The second ideal characteristic of revolutionary martyrdom regards age. Revolutionary martyrs must die at a young age. If they die at an advanced age, society tends to mitigate the effect of their death. We are all familiar with such rationalized, although meant as consoling, comments after an aged loved one passes away - "You must be thankful that he lived to a ripe old age before he left you," or "He certainly lived life to its fullest." The same is true with fallen revolutionary martyrs. Only youthful exemplars will engender an endearing sympathy from society. Thus, for the purpose of this discourse I have set the boundary of youth as forty years old or less.

Next, the revolutionary martyr must serve to divide society into two sides - one good and the other evil. Hence, if the martyr suffered at the hands of a particular agent representing one social group, that entire group can be labelled as the "side of tyranny" while the martyr's community can be perceived as the "side of the oppressed." Detentions, trials, or executions ordered by some agent of authority (judicial, military, or otherwise) serve as indicators for this division. One social group can therefore be specifically held responsible for the martyr's death and ergo blame can be brought to bear on that particular group.

Another ideal characteristic of a revolutionary martyr is that he must have been associated with some type of passive occupation prior to taking up arms for the

⁹María José Moyano, "Personal Remarks Concerning Membership in Revolutionary Organizations," Naval Postgraduate School, 4 April 1994. Professor Moyano is a noted scholar on political violence. She has spoken on and taught a variety of courses concerning this topic at both the University of Vermont and Naval Postgraduate School.

revolutionary cause. This signifies that he is not, as his rivals are, inherently violent or evil. Instead, a martyr's subsequent adoption of violence could be judged as having been caused by a preceding tyrannical power and that his actions were merely necessary to correct a social injustice.

Fifth, the ideal revolutionary martyr must have exuded leadership qualities while alive. The leader distinction grants a certain degree of fame and notoriety in life but also serves as a harbinger for future honor and glory in death. His image will no doubt be singled out by his surviving followers from the other fallen comrades within the movement. Next, the revolutionary martyr must have been either a powerful speaker, or a great writer. These personal skills can serve as the basis for subsequent and continual use of his image by the group. Re-enacted or reprinted speeches and writings are a constant reminder to his followers that while he is gone, his ideas remain. It also adds to a supernatural illusion that his persona is omnipresent, forever watching and guiding the movement toward victory.

The seventh ideal revolutionary martyr characteristic is that he should be celibate. Symbolizing an extreme commitment to the revolutionary cause, this ascetic attitude has been a much celebrated and necessary lifestyle particularly for priests and nuns in the Roman Catholic Church. Celibacy, however, is extremely difficult to prove or to likewise disprove. Thus, revolutionary groups may instead rely on affirming their exemplar's bachelorhood to signify a devotion and commitment to their ideology.¹⁰

¹⁰Celibacy in certain cultures is not as important as it is in others. For example in Islamic societies, Muhammed the Prophet, was a polygamist and produced children with a number of his wives. Thus, in these societies the trait of celibacy is overshadowed by man's

Revolutionary martyr's must also have predicted their own demise. A verifiable premonition of death convinces an audience that what the martyr has said will ultimately come true. He knows what the future will bring. Through association this omen can also lend merit to the prophecies of the inevitable victory and the coming millennium. Finally, a revolutionary martyr must be well educated. Having attained some sort of verifiable degree of education increases a perception that a martyr has mastered the knowledge of worldly empirical disciplines in life. In death, it may follow, he can be relied upon to set course toward the unseen and as yet unproven.

Again, this profile is a perfect ideal. It is very difficult indeed to find a revolutionary exemplar which matches exactly each of these nine "saintly" qualities. Clearly, however, those areas which revolutionary martyrs fall short are continually cited by groups disputing their martyrdom as evidence to their human frailty. Take for instance the revolutionary martyrdom of Ernesto "Ché" Guevara. After his death, most Latin American authorities tried to undermine his character, citing in particular his lewd sexual lifestyle and ridiculing his failed strategy of the *Focoist* revolution. Therefore, while Guevara's icon adorned the banners of student radical movements throughout the world, his martyrdom was never fully embraced by other groups contending with tyrannical powers. Instead, other national revolutionaries were chosen as *paradigmatic martyrs*.¹¹

responsibility to both women and children, as well as to God. We might therefore expect that in Islamic revolutionary movements, *paradigmatic martyrs* would not necessarily adhere to this ideal.

¹¹Such was especially the case in Nicaragua where Sandino's martyrdom became paramount to any other Latin American revolutionary. For an excellent synopsis of the choice of his martyred image over other figures and its impact on the FSLN movement in Nicaragua see David Nolan, FSLN: The ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan


The final dimension - *legitimate authority* - completes the construction of a *paradigmatic truth*. Revolutionary martyrs that possess *legitimate authority* do so because of their ability to invoke an ancestral link to an already accustomed social paradigm.¹² *Legitimate authority* neither recasts a new paradigm, nor does it modify pre-existing paradigms. Instead, it reinforces those paradigms which already exist. Such was the case in the panoply of national Christian saints, following in Christ's path. Such is still the case with revolutionary martyrs today.

Thus, a revolutionary martyr's paradigmatic proportionality can be aptly traced along three dimensions. Along the x-axis we can show a relative scale of the *truth perception* concerning the manner of a martyr's death. A perceived suicide would register an insignificant value and a murder would register a substantial value. Along the y-axis we can determine nine incremental values for each corresponding adherence to the *credibility* of the ideal martyr profile, thus giving the martyr an increased "area" of proportional strength. Finally, along the z-axis we must research the extent that a martyr's image invokes *legitimate authority* by establishing a strong ancestral link to a preexisting social charter of reality. If present this will allow us to relate the martyr's proportional strength as a "volumetric" cube as Figure 3 illustrates on the next page.

Revolution, (Coral Gables: Institute of InterAmerican Studies, 1988), pp. 16-18.

¹²Lincoln, "Discourse," pp. 18-26.

FIGURE - 3



In the following section I will test this paradigmatic dimensional model using three cases of revolutionary martyrs - Hunger striker, Bobby Sands of the Provisional IRA, Philippine Nationalist, José Rizal, and Amal Shi'a Cleric, *Imam* Musa al Sadr. In each case we will determine each social dimension of paradigmatic proportionality. Finally, we will examine whether each revolutionary martyr has the inherent ability to influence his constituency in the years to come.

B. THE MARTYRDOM OF ROBERT "BOBBY" SANDS

Robert "Bobby" Sands was born in Belfast Northern Ireland in 1954. He was the eldest of four children from an Irish Catholic family. From the onset, Sands showed "no special gifts, he did not stand out, shine at school, show special leadership qualities, [or]

do anything that would attract anything more than passing attention."¹³ But by the early 1970's, his once peaceful, predominantly Protestant neighborhood in Rathcoole, Belfast was torn apart by political violence. It was this chaos which would eventually thrust Sands into the world's spotlight.

Victimized by a campaign by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), a Protestant paramilitary organization, to harass Catholic families into leaving their estates, Sands' otherwise happy and uneventful adolescence in Rathcoole soon ended. Author Padraig O'Malley writes:

Following the introduction of internment in August 1971, intimidation of Catholics became an everyday occurrence and the situation grew steadily worse there in absence of adequate protection by either the police or the army. The collapse of communal order was increasingly evident. Because there was an inadequate police presence, intimidation went unchallenged. Families sat up late into the night, tuned into the police channel to find out exactly where the mob was, which street they were heading toward, waiting for the anonymous fire bombs that would come hurling through the window.¹⁴

Eventually, this violence succeeded in pushing the Sands family out of Rathcoole. Sands' sister, Bernadette, stated "It ended up when everything erupted that the friends [Sands] went about with for years were the same ones who joined the [UDA] ... , pointed him out and got him beaten."¹⁵

By June 1972, having lived with the constant threat of Protestant violence, Sands now eighteen years old, joined the IRA. He said, "I had seen too many homes

¹³Padraig O'Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), p. 38.

¹⁴Ibid, p. 42.

¹⁵As cited in Ibid, p. 42.

wrecked, fathers and sons arrested, neighbors hurt, [and] friends murdered."¹⁶ Within six months he was arrested for the first time on a weapons charge and imprisoned for three and half years. Up to this time Sands' Republican allegiance was visceral; in prison he learned to rationalize it.

A personal student of future Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, Sands learned to speak Gaelic, he read the poetry of Irishman Eithne Carbery and he studied the revolutionary writings of Guevara, Fanon, and Torres. He quickly became well versed in the history and politics of Irish Republican despair.¹⁷ By the time of his release, Sands was a well-versed and well-trained political revolutionary.¹⁸

Six months after his release, however, Sands was arrested again, charged for possession of a handgun and sentenced this time to fourteen years in the Maze/Long Kesh prison. It was here that Sands gained the notoriety that he failed to achieve before. Claiming that he was subjected to the most severe forms of psychological and physical torture, Sands wrote:

I scratched my name and not for fame
upon the whitened wall;
Bobby Sands was here, I wrote with fear
In awful shaky scrawl.
I wrote it low where eyes don't go
'Twas but to testify,
That I was sane and not to blame

¹⁶John M. Feehan, Bobby Sands and the Tragedy of Northern Ireland, (Dublin: The Mercier Press, 1983), pp. 75-76.

¹⁷O'Malley, p. 45.

¹⁸Feehan, pp. 86-87.

Should here I come to die.¹⁹

But it was not Sands literary prowess alone that etched a place in history for him. His "fame" was sealed by his prison group's hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981.

Hunger strikes had been embraced by the Irish Republican Army prisoners at least as far back as the 1920's.²⁰ By 1972, however, the hunger strike had become a prominent strategy within the IRA's continued resistance against British occupation. Author Jack Holland writes:

In May of that year a group of Provisionals led by ex-Belfast commanding officer Billy McKee, who had been convicted of an arms charge, won recognition as political prisoners from a beleaguered British administration. The concessions, which were granted after a hunger strike, included the right to free association... the right to wear their own clothes... and the right to refuse to do prison work. It was an implicit recognition from the Conservative government that they were dealing with a powerfully motivated political movement.²¹

By the mid 1970's, however, convicted IRA members were no longer granted special prisoner of war status by the British authorities. Instead, a new policy of "criminalization" was adopted. This policy dispelled the "special category" status of IRA members. From 1976 on, "anyone convicted would be treated as an ordinary criminal ..." "jailed in newly constructed prison facilities..." and housed "in eight-by-twelve foot

¹⁹As cited in Ibid, p. 90.

²⁰O' Malley, p. 26. Also, former IRA leader Séan MacStiofáin explains that hunger strikes were particularly embraced by IRA inmates as a form of civil disobedience to protest British persecutions of other revolutionaries in the 1950s as well - in this case Greek EOKA resistance fighters. "Whenever word of such an execution came in, they had a practice of going on hunger strike for forty-eight hours." Séan MacStiofáin, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (Great Britain: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), p. 77.

²¹Jack Holland, Too Long a Sacrifice: Life and Death in Northern Ireland since 1969, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1981), p. 123.

cells...."²²

By 1980, this new policy although known by new phraseology, led to the same results - harsh often brutal treatment of IRA prisoners. Sands describes some of the torture he endured himself:

I was brought down the stairs into the interrogation building again. This interrogation lasted about two hours and was followed by another which lasted two hours. During both of these I was slapped, punched, threatened etc ... After dinner at about 3:00 p.m. I was taken to the last room of the interrogation building ... I was set upon by two detectives. I was punched very heavily across the head, ears, face and eyes. I was kicked in the legs. My head was smashed against a wooden wall ... After this beating I was told to set down I was given a cigarette as if nothing had happened ²³

This maltreatment also documented by the European Commission of Human Rights and Amnesty International, led the Long Kesh prisoners in cell block H to re-adopt McKee's once successful strategy of protest.

By October 1980, after a series of efforts to engage British authorities in negotiations to prevent the continued policies in Maze/Long Kesh prison failed, seven Republican prisoners started a hunger strike. By mid December, these seven prisoners and twenty-three others that followed them were duped into believing that their demands had been met and the strike was called off.²⁴ Less than three months later, with a renewed resolve

²²O'Malley, pp. 19-20.

²³As cited in Feehan, p. 93.

²⁴Brendan Hughes, a Maze hunger striker in charge of interfacing with officials from the Northern Ireland Office - the intermediary between the IRA and the British Cabinet - was led to believe that a settlement proposal was on its way. It was not. Hughes, however, acted in the belief that a settlement was on its way and called off the strike. Later, to save face the hunger strikers reported that they honored an appeal from Cardinal O'Fiaich to end their protest. See O'Malley, pp. 30-33.

a new strike was called. On 5 May 1981, this strike claimed its first victim - Bobby Sands. Nine more prisoners died and still their demands were ignored.

Martyrdom has long played a role in the IRA. Author Jack Holland explains:

The motif of martyrdom runs through the IRA tradition as strongly as the theme of victory does in the annals of loyalism. It gilds violent death with a layer of sentimentality that disguises its ugliness, its brutality. To sacrifice oneself and others for the cause of Ireland becomes a hallowed act untouched by violence's sordid reality.²⁵

Although no one can deny that Bobby Sands sacrificed his life to the cause of the Irish Republic, the manner in which he did so challenged the very principals that Republicans embraced. Sands' martyrdom while declared almost immediately²⁶ would prove to be a very contentious and a divisive force even within his own community.

When we attempt to analyze Sands martyrdom in the context of our paradigmatic model of effectiveness, we can see just how limited the breadth of its reach was. First, Sands' manner of death could and was easily construed as suicidal. Not only was this opinion endorsed by the British,²⁷ but it was also maintained by some Irish Catholic

²⁵Holland, pp. 57-58.

²⁶For a description of the IRA's efforts to martyr Sands in art, literature, and ritual see O'Malley, pp. 117-120 and pp. 157-159.

²⁷Padraig O'Malley reports that British dailies "succinctly expressed the British view [concerning Sands death]. Sands ... 'committed suicide in the full knowledge of what he was doing and determined to reject all initiatives designed to save his life. He was not hounded to death. He was not in prison for his beliefs but for proven serious criminal offenses. He was not being oppressed or ill treated. There was only one killer of Bobby Sands and that was Bobby Sands himself.'" Cited in *Ibid*, p. 201.

authorities.²⁸ Father Denis O'Callaghan pointed to the immoral designs of the hunger strikers as early as June 1981, stating: "one cannot ignore the general consequences which will follow on one's action, because one is responsible for the full foreseeable consequences of what one does." This led him to conclude that Sands' manner of death was morally unjustifiable.²⁹ In fact, even before the Maze/Long Kesh contingent of hunger strikers set out on their self destructive course their plans were immediately criticized on "tactical", "strategical", "physical", and "moral" grounds, by their own IRA comrades.³⁰ Clearly, the *truth perception* concerning Sands' martyrdom was, at best, limited from the onset.

Sands' personal traits and conditions surrounding his martyrdom did, however, establish a plausible level of *credibility*. When analyzing his profile in relation to the ideal revolutionary martyr, he meets seven of the nine criteria.³¹ Sands falls short only in the areas of celibacy and intelligence. Sands married his childhood sweetheart and this wedlock produced one child, a boy named Gerard. By 1976, however, his marriage had

²⁸"Cardinal Basil Hume, Catholic archbishop of Westminster, called the hunger strikes "a form of violence, violence to the hunger strikers themselves' that 'could not be condoned by the Church as being in accordance with God's will for men.' Sands' death, he said, was suicide, as was 'any hunger striker's death that [included] with it the intention to die.'" In any case the division within the Catholic Church over the question of hunger strikers' deaths being suicides was "more defined" than every before. As cited in Ibid, p. 174 and pp. 176-177.

²⁹As cited in Ibid, p. 188.

³⁰When Sands wrote to Gerry Adams, then Vice-President of Sinn Féin, about plans for a hunger strike, he believed the Provisional IRA would fully support their operations. Surprisingly, Adams responded, "...we are tactically, strategically, physically and morally opposed to a hunger strike." As cited in Feehan, p. 109.

³¹See Appendix B, Table 2.

failed and his wife subsequently moved to England. This served to rebuke and embarrass Bobby's personal drives toward Northern Ireland nationalism. Secondly, Sands' intelligence, although claimed by IRA propaganda documents, could never be adequately proven. Although his political indoctrination left Sands with an improved education it was nonetheless one sided. One glaring fact also remained - he quit school at the age of fifteen. Thus, Sands could never claim to have a breadth of knowledge so typical of other revolutionary martyrs.


Finally, Sands' martyred image was extremely difficult to legitimately establish any firm ancestral ties to the Irish Republican cause. First, his family surname did not match any previous IRA hero's nor did it sound particularly Irish Catholic.³² Second, Sands grew up in predominantly Protestant neighborhoods and while in school had befriended a number of Anglican youths. Third, after his passing, allegations spread quickly that Sands was not the Irish Catholic exemplar he was originally made out to be. Sands' father, it was revealed, was Protestant.³³ Finally, his entire movement within the Maze/Long Kesh Prison was discredited by Sinn Féin and the IRA, writ large. Subsequent efforts to restore any semblance of legitimate tie to him after the fact have been labelled as mere acts of equivocation.³⁴

³²O'Malley, p. 37.

³³As reported by the BBC in a television program titled "Old Scores." Others claimed that Sands' paternal grandfather was Protestant. Still others dismissed these reports entirely. Nonetheless, Author Padraig O'Malley admits "having the leftovers of an inherited Protestant mentality, the residue of Protestant genes somewhere in the bloodlines, " indelibly tarnished Sands' martyrdom. See Ibid, p. 37.

³⁴Ibid, p. 183.

Thus, Bobby Sands martyrdom has become somewhat less spectacular than one might think. As Figure 3A shows below, when using the paradigmatic proportionality model, Sands' martyrdom clearly fails to fulfill any of the dimensions required for a social template.



Thirteen years after his death, Sands' name is little more than a faint reminder of a failed policy of a few Irish Catholic prisoners. Instead, the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland continue to embrace heroes of a distant past as their martyred paradigms.³⁵

C. THE MARTYRDOM OF JOSÉ RIZAL

Our next case study concerns Philippine nationalist, José Rizal. Born in the province of Laguna in 1861, Rizal was the seventh of eleven children. His family was Chinese mestizo with a bloodline that consisted also of Spanish and native Filipino ancestry. As

³⁵As of the time of this writing, Hollywood plans on filming a autobiographical movie concerning the life of Michael Collins, martyred leader of the IRB and Easter Uprising. Rumors have circulated that heartthrob Kevin Costner will play the leading role.

a youngster José excelled in his studies, especially history and religion.³⁶ His mother - Teodora Alonso - was largely responsible for his yearning for knowledge, often reading to him and quizzing him about his academic work. Author Austin Coates notes that Teodora's and José's relationship was strengthened by bonds of love and understanding stating: "Between mother and son there was a close affinity"³⁷ that didn't exist in the same degree with her other children. By 1868, however, events in the Philippines would forever impact upon José's once tranquil adolescence.

The Philippines, a colony of Spain for more than two hundred years, was "less obviously rich than the American colonies," but was nonetheless "subject[ed] to the same intermittently profitable exploitation ..." ³⁸ as the rest of Spain's colonial possessions had been. Throughout this period of colonialism, native Filipinos were treated as little more than slaves. In fact, "in their dealings with the [native Filipinos] ..." the Spanish officials "were inclined to be domineering, arrogant, insolent, and contemptuous."³⁹

After Queen Isabella had been deposed in October 1868 and the Spanish Liberals had taken power, the Filipinos lot had improved considerably. Soon thereafter, a fervent democratic spirit embraced by Philippine Governor Carlos Ma. de la Torre quickly

³⁶Possibly a prophesy in the making, Rizal was especially fond of the tales of the early Christian martyrs. See Austin Coates, Rizal: Philippine Nationalist and Martyr, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 16.

³⁷Ibid, p. 14.

³⁸Frank Gibney, The Pacific Century: America and Asia in a Changing World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p. 33.

³⁹Nicholas Zafra, Jose Rizal: Historical Studies, (Quezon City: University of Philippines Press, 1977), p. 25.

engulfed the Philippines.⁴⁰ Yet, this spirit was short lived as the Spanish Liberals, suspicious of de la Torre's reforms, recalled him from the islands and installed the despotic Rafael de Izquierda as the new governor. The change of administration was immediately felt by the Filipinos. Author Austin Coates notes: "From the enthusiastic optimism of de la Torre's governorship, Filipino intellectuals passed into a mood of disillusion,"⁴¹ well founded and substantiated by the renewed oppression of the Spanish bureaucrats controlled by de Izquierda.

Describing the conditions during de Izquierda's regime, José Rizal wrote:

I spent many, many hours of my childhood down on the shore of the lake, Laguna de Bay. I was thinking of what was beyond, I was dreaming of what might be over the other side of the waves. Almost everyday, in our town, we saw the *Guardia Civil* lieutenant caning and injuring some unarmed and inagressive villagers. The villager's only fault was that while at distance he had not taken off his hat and made his bow. The *alcalde* treated the poor villagers in the same way whenever he visited us.⁴²

Soon these acts of brutality were to directly impact upon the Rizal family. At the age of ten, José's mother foolishly took sides in a family squabble, which left her in the end accused of a capital offense. The Spanish authorities subsequently arrested her, humiliated her and the family, and subjected her to physical punishment for more than two and one-half years.⁴³ From this point on, José learned what it was like to personally

⁴⁰"The new government sent as governor ... Carlos Ma. de la Torre. The new governor brought to the Philippines ... the liberal and democratic spirit of the Revolution of 1868. He did away with the censorship of the press and the ban on the holding of public demonstrations. He displayed a friendly and cordial attitude toward the inhabitants of the Philippines." Ibid, p. 15.

⁴¹Coates, p. 29.

⁴²As cited in Zafra, p. 25.

⁴³Ibid, p. 25.

live under the sword of the Spanish *Guardia Civil*.

One other event that was to have an enormous influence upon Rizal was the Cavite Affair of 1872. Tired of de Izquierda's tyranny, native Filipino soldiers mutinied against their Spanish officers at the Cavite military arsenal on the shores of Manila Bay. The Spanish authorities claimed at the time that this was indicative of a widespread conspiracy to overthrow the colonial government in the Philippines.⁴⁴ Thousands of alleged Filipino conspirators were executed, imprisoned or exiled for their supposed roles in this mutiny. Included among these were three Filipino Catholic clergymen, Fathers José Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora.⁴⁵ The execution of Father Burgos, personal tutor of José's eldest brother - Paciano, had a pronounced affect upon Rizal. He wrote: "In the face of those injustices and cruelties, my youthful imagination was aroused and I swore to avenge some day those numberless persons who suffered from them."⁴⁶

During the next twenty years, Rizal travelled abroad to pursue his studies. By 1886 he had attained degrees in medicine and philosophy from the University of Madrid. More importantly, however, his travels aroused the great spirit of nationalism within him. It was also during this time in Europe that he wrote and published a novel, *Noli Me Tángere*. In it he described "the social conditions, the livelihood, the beliefs, the hopes, the vices, the complaints, the grievances of ... [the Filipino] people.... unmask[ing] the hypocrisy, which under the cloak of religion, came to ... [the] country to impoverish ...

⁴⁴Coates, p. 28.

⁴⁵All three priests were accused of masterminding the affair, tried by a military court, found guilty, and "publicly garroted." Ibid, p. 28.

⁴⁶Zafra, p. 17.

[and] brutalize ... [Filipinos]. "⁴⁷ Rizal was immediately branded a subversive by the Spanish officials. In spite of this, he continued to stir and incite Filipinos to action while overseas, so it was not surprising that when he returned to the islands in 1892, he was promptly exiled to Mindanao.

On the day of his exile, a band of young Filipino rebels inspired by Rizal's writings and led by Andrés Bonifacio formed the *Katipunan* armed revolutionary movement. Although Rizal was to have no active part in the armed uprising for independence which lasted nearly three decades, he was later brought back to Manila, tried by the Spanish authorities and shot by a *Guardia Civil* firing squad. Subsequently, Rizal became the "Tagalog Christ."⁴⁸ Author Austin Coates states that:

... the parallel between the two lives is inescapable in the impression each conveys of a man sent into the world to fulfill a purpose for which he was aware that everything must be sacrificed, as also he was aware that it might be required of him to be killed as part of that purpose. Many men receive intimations of their future, and other lives may equally have resembled that of Christ; martyrdoms have numerous similarities. What is unique in Rizal's life is the mass of written evidence demonstrating this aspect of it.⁴⁹

Indeed, this documented parallel contributes greatly to the effective strength of Rizal's image for most Filipinos to this day.

An examination of Rizal's martyrdom clearly reveals a broadened proportional paradigm. With regard to our first dimension - *truth perception* - it was easy to see that the circumstances surrounding Rizal's death could easily be construed as a murder plot.

⁴⁷Rizal as cited in Ibid, p. 36.

⁴⁸Tagalog is the national language of the Philippines. Coates, p. 352.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 352.

At his trial all evidence was presented in the form of sworn written testimonies, with no personal witnesses being allowed to testify before the military tribunal. Also no rebuttals to these statements were allowed. Years later, it became apparent that the Spaniards "wanted only blood"⁵⁰ to avenge the revolutionary insurrection by Bonifacio.⁵¹ Unlike Sands, Rizal's image could thus remain highly resistant to charges and accusations over a self-inflicted death.

Secondly, Rizal's *credibility* as a martyr is not only plausible but so nearly saint-like as to be uncanny. He meets all nine criteria of the ideal revolutionary martyr profile.⁵² Particularly noteworthy was Rizal's unwavering heroism in the face of death. On the night before his scheduled execution, he composed *Ultimo Adiós* - his last poem - to his family, friends, and countrymen. He wrote:

Farewell, my adored country, region beloved of the sun,
Pearl of the Orient Sea, our lost Eden.
Departing in happiness, to you I give the sad, withered,
remains of my life;
And had it been a life more brilliant, more fine, more fulfilled,
Even so it is to you I would have given it, willingly to you.⁵³

Even moments before he was to be shot, Rizal requested that he die standing, unblindfolded, and facing his executioners. The last of these three requests was denied.

⁵⁰Ibid, p. 297.

⁵¹After Rizal's execution, one Spanish official - Ramón Blanco - admitted the haste and injustice surrounding Rizal's sentencing saying that "he would never have condemned Rizal to death." Later still he presented his sword and sash to the Rizal family as an apologetic gesture for his role in the execution. See Ibid, p. 297.

⁵²Again, see Appendix B, Table 2 - Revolutionary Martyrs: A Database.

⁵³Rizal, *Ultimo Adiós* as cited in Coates, p. 321.

Traitors, the Spaniards thought, should always be shot in the back.⁵⁴


To paraphrase Rizal's words, it is in the last paradigmatic dimension - *legitimate authority* - that his martyred image withers. Never a unified nation, the Philippines has struggled to attain a sense of a national identity since its independence. Author Frank Gibney notes that the Philippines has "no ancient sense of nationhood," "no pervasive religion or any authority that range[s] beyond a few village kinship groups."⁵⁵ For these reasons one can understand why the country has been undermined by internal strife for decades. The son of a privileged Chinese mestizo and Roman Catholic family, Rizal's image imparts only limited affective value beyond the privileged middle and upper classes in Manila. To thousands within the impoverished classes and the predominantly muslim population in Mindanao now struggling for independence against those in authority in Manila, Rizal remains just a face on a statue or a name on a poem. Thus, Jose Rizal's martyrdom has only a limited depth of *legitimate authority*.

While Jose Rizal's life and death is certainly worthy of honor and praise, his martyrdom is frustratingly unfulfilled. Using our paradigmatic proportionality model, shown as Figure 3B on the next page, Rizal fully satisfies the first two social dimensions yet fails to establish a broadened communal link to the core of a Filipino nation.

⁵⁴Ibid, p. 330.

⁵⁵Gibney, p. 472.

FIGURE 3B



Yet, there is hope that Rizal's image can and will endure as a lasting symbol for at least some Filipinos. The discreditation of the malevolent Marcos regime, the subsequent election of Corazón Aquino and removal of American forces from Philippine soil, and the apparent weakening of subversive elements in the country has sparked a renewed belief that the Philippines will realize its destiny as a nation. Whether all Filipinos will come to embrace Rizal as a national martyr, however, still remains questionable.

D. THE MARTYRDOM OF MUSA AL SADR

Our last case study of revolutionary martyrdom involves the Shi'ite cleric of Lebanon, the *Imam* Musa al Sadr. Born in Qom, Iran in 1928 Musa al Sadr was the son of an *alim*, a Shi'ite religious scholar. Although Musa al Sadr's education initially followed a path of purely secular endeavors by pursuing a degree in law,⁵⁶ Sayyid Abdul Hussein Sharif

⁵⁶Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon, (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 42.

al Din,⁵⁷ a relative and mufti of Tyre, Lebanon, persuaded him to complete his studies in religion. Musa subsequently excelled throughout four years of religious training in Najaf, Iraq, one of the most renown Shi'ite centers of learning. After Abdul Hussein passed away in 1957, Musa al Sadr was invited to Tyre to become this Shi'ite community's new mufti. It was here that Musa al Sadr initiated what was to be one of the most remarkable political mobilization and revolutionary efforts in modern history.

For centuries the Lebanese Shi'a had been a deprived community. Under Ottoman rule the Shi'a were directly controlled and manipulated by a landholding elite, the *zu'ama*. These "political bosses"⁵⁸ extracted taxes from their clients in exchange for a variety of social services. Often the delivery of these services went frustratingly unrealized. By the time Musa al Sadr arrived in Tyre, however, it became obvious that Lebanese state officials had done little to change what had become customary under the Ottomans. Moreover, state institutions withheld access and denied privileges to Shi'a along social, economic, and political lines.

Social advancement opportunities for Shi'a were often non existent, only half of whom had any exposure to formal education avenues, while in comparison the state average participation in academic institutions stood at seventy percent.⁵⁹ Political discrimination was also evident. Shi'a, although the most populous sectarian affiliation, comprising

⁵⁷ A *Sayyid* is a Shi'a who claims descendency from the Prophet Muhammed. Like Abdul Hussein al Din, Musa al Sadr was also a Sayyid, see Ibid, p. 42.

⁵⁸ Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 15.

⁵⁹ Joseph Chamie as cited in Norton, p. 163.

almost one third of the country's citizens, by 1977,⁶⁰ only accounted for 19 of the 99 seats within the confessional system of the National Assembly even by the 1980s.⁶¹ Economically speaking, the Shi'ite community's status lagged far behind the national average. In 1971, an average Shi'ite family earned 4,532 Lebanese pounds, more than 27 percent less than the Lebanese average family income.⁶² Gradually Musa al Sadr endeavored to change these widely felt indisgressions against his adopted Lebanese community.

In 1969, Shi'a political and social mobilization began in earnest under the direction of Musa al Sadr. Then President Charles Helou, after Sadr's effective campaign for a Shi'a voice in state affairs, allowed the creation of the Higher Shi'a Islamic Council. This was the first distinctly Shi'ite organization recognized by Lebanese state authorities. The Charter for the Higher Shi'a Islamic reads:

The Islamic Shi'a sect (taifa) is independent in its religious affairs and endowments and institutions. It has its own sons who speak in its name according to the rules of the Sharia (Islamic Law) and to the Shi'a jurisprudence as set by the opinions of the Grand Marjha.⁶³

Using the Higher Shi'a Islamic Council as a political forum, Musa al Sadr began to disrupt the traditional power bases by demanding more for his community.

⁶⁰In 1977, French family planning experts estimated that the Shi'a comprised 30% of the total Lebanese population. Maronites were the second largest sectarian group with about 25% of the population, followed by Sunnis and other Christian sects with about 20%, and finally, Druze with 5%. As cited in Helena Cobban, "The Shi'a Community and the Future of Lebanon, " The Muslim World Today, 2, (1985), p. 9.

⁶¹Norton, p. 17.

⁶²Joseph Chamie as cited in Ibid, p. 163.

⁶³Najab Jamil al Din, Al Shi'a, as cited in Ajami, p. 115-116.

First, he successfully led a program in the city of Tyre to cure its problem of vagrancy. Second, as author Augustus Richard Norton notes, he devised:

the establishment of a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al-Shimali, which was constructed at a cost of half a million Lebanese pounds (c. \$165,000 U.S.) with monies provided by Shi'a benefactors, the Ministry of Education, and bank loans. The institute would become an important symbol of his leadership; it is still in operation, providing vocational training for about 500 orphans under the watchful eyes of Musa's sister Rahab al-Sadr.⁶⁴

Finally, Musa al Sadr called for a general strike in southern Lebanon in 1970 to protest the squalor infecting the Shi'ite community. The strike swayed President Helou to grant an allocation of ten million dollars and a creation of a Council of the South.⁶⁵ No Shi'a leader had ever been able to win concessions from the government on behalf of his people. In this manner, Musa al Sadr stood alone.

His legend reached epic proportions and truly reflected its extraordinary efficacy when his followers bestowed upon him the title of *Imam*. The title's significance is deeply rooted in Shi'ism, in that only twelve *Imams* have been universally recognized in that faith - beginning with the first *Imam* Ali and ending with the twelfth Imam, *al Mahdi al Muntazar* (the Vanished Great One).⁶⁶ Musa al Sadr appeared when the Lebanese Shi'a had almost lost its hope and faith. Their first national *Imam*⁶⁷ had resurrected their faith and hence he deserved preeminent recognition. Fouad Ajami writes:

And once the title emerged, its magic and power were obvious. It tapped into the

⁶⁴Norton, p. 39.

⁶⁵Ajami, p.126.

⁶⁶See Chapter II for a summary of Islamic Shi'a lore concerning martyrs.

⁶⁷Ajami, p. 119.

millenarian expectation already read into Musa al Sadr by some of his devoted followers... In a country of sects he had become the preeminent cleric of one of the principal sects.⁶⁸

With Musa al Sadr, Lebanese Shi'a clearly had found their "god-sent master."⁶⁹

Even as Lebanese Shi'a bequeathed to its cleric the *Imamite* in fulfillment of traditions and prophesies of the *Hadith*, Musa al Sadr called for a very radical political direction of Lebanon. His thoughts were reflected in *The Charter of the Amal Movement*. It reads:

The Amal Movement believes in the citizen's complete freedom and relentlessly combats despotism, feudalism, authoritarianism, and all forms of discrimination. Political sectarianism in the Lebanese system prevents political development divides citizens, and upsets national unity. For that reason, our movement rejects it and considers it a manifestation of political backwardness in our country.⁷⁰

His rejection of the rational rule (Lebanon's confessional system of governance) of his adopted country was nothing short of treasonous.

Musa al Sadr matched words with deeds after the organization he had created, the Higher Islamic Shi'a Council, evolved into a lame duck bureaucracy of clerics. Fouad Ajami states:

The Cleric was without illusion about the council over which he presided. He knew and said of it that it was born amputated. After all, the nineteen Shi'a members of Parliament had cornered nineteen of the forty-three seats on the councils executive committee. These were, on the whole, men of the old order, who knew the country and its ways. They knew that the council could be controlled, and the their own judgements would carry more weight than those of others.⁷¹

⁶⁸Ibid, p. 121.

⁶⁹Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.1114.

⁷⁰*The Charter of the Amal Movement* as translated and reprinted in Norton, pp. 144-166.

⁷¹Ajami, p. 121.

Musa al Sadr realized that the Lebanese government, controlled by other sects and his community, exploited by a Shi'a *zu'ama*, were far removed from the problems facing the Shi'a and had become ineffectual. Therefore, he devised a new political scheme for his community - mass popular movements - *Haraket al-Mahrumin* and *Haraket Amal*.

Never before had such a political leader consumed Lebanese Shi'a. In March 1974, at the founding rally of *Haraket al-Mahrumin*, literally meaning "Movement of the Oppressed," more than 75,000 followers of Musa al Sadr jammed into the city of Ba'albeck to object to their years of neglect.⁷² At this rally, Sadr asked: "What does the government expect? What does it expect except rage and except revolution?"⁷³ Two months later, his presence attracted thousands again this time at a political rally in Bekaa.⁷⁴ By July of 1975, Musa al Sadr had generated the auspices of an organization which could support its own militia. *Amal*⁷⁵ (an acronym for *Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniya*, or Lebanese Resistance Battalions) was born. The transformation of *Haraket al-Mahrumin* into *Amal* had a magnificent affect upon Shi'a. Fouad Ajami stated:

Into the ranks of *Amal* came a wide variety of politically active Shi'a youth. Some were *assimilés* formerly active in leftist and Palestinian groups; disillusioned with the Palestinians and the left, they now wanted to belong to a movement of their own sect. The country was giving up on universal and ideological pretensions; men were

⁷²Interestingly, the city of Ba'albeck had a population of about 10,000 people at the time of this rally. *An Nahar*, March 18, 1974, as cited in Ajami, p. 145.

⁷³As cited in Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 58.

⁷⁴*An Nahar*, 6 May 1974, as cited in Ajami, p. 147.

⁷⁵The Arabic word *Amal* translated to English means "hope."

returning to the world of their kinsmen.⁷⁶

Truly, the charismatic leadership of Musa al Sadr had produced an authentic Shi'ite movement and was a social force growing in political strength and effectiveness.

Up to this point, critics of the Lebanese *Imam* denied the extent of his achievements. Some have claimed that "it was the multi - confessional parties and militias that attracted the majority of Shi'a recruits, and many more Shi'as carried arms under their colors than under the banner of *Amal*."⁷⁷ In any case, what the charismatic Musa al Sadr did not accomplish in life, however, was certainly achieved after his disappearance in 1978.

After a September 1978 visit to Libya to secure support for Lebanese Shi'a from Colnel Mu'amar al Qaddafi, *Imam* Musa al Sadr vanished. Investigations later revealed that the cleric's bags arrived in an airport in Rome, Italy.⁷⁸ While some reports have indicated that he is still alive today, Augustus Richard Norton states, "Most impartial observers believe him to be dead, as do a good number of his followers when speaking about him privately."⁷⁹ In any case, *Imam* Musa has been elevated to a paradigmatic martyr in the

⁷⁶Ajami, p. 169.

⁷⁷Norton, pp. 48-49.

⁷⁸Three major theories have emerged from this mysterious event. First, some believe that Musa al Sadr was the victim of an assassination plot ordered by Qaddafi. These people feel that the Libyan president felt betrayed by al Sadr as Qaddafi believed that Musa had pocketed a prior Libyan loan to the Lebanese Shi'a. Others believe that Musa al Sadr was executed by agents of the Shah of Iran's secret police - the Savak - as a response to many of the disparaging remarks made by the Imam against the Shah. The last theory holds some faction of the PLO responsible for Musa's disappearance. Those that adhere to this theory believe that Musa al Sadr was executed because of his growing public opposition to Palestinian refugees in southern Lebanon. For a more in-depth discussion of these theories see Ibid, pp. 52-55.

⁷⁹Ibid, p. 52.

Lebanese Shi'a community⁸⁰ and his disappearance has caused a militant arousal of Lebanese Shi'a and has thrust them into a preeminent role in the country's Civil War especially since 1983.

At first glance Musa al Sadr's martyrdom was an unlikely choice to reach an advanced level of paradigmatic proportionality. A cleric born in Iran and whose death was never proven, seemingly has little chance to arouse sentiments and incite action in a Lebanese community. Yet, his image has become extraordinarily powerful. Our model again can be helpful in explaining the symbolic strength of his martyrdom. The first dimension - *truth perception* has as much to do with the acceptance that a tyrannical power is responsible for a an individual's suffering, in this case disappearance, as it does with verified claims of murder. Of the three theories concerning Musa al Sadr's disappearance not one suggests that the cleric took his own life or was personally responsible for his disappearance. All of them do, however, paint a picture of an *Imam* being the victim of a plot of trickery. This is evidenced by the founding of a small group of militant members of Amal called the *Sadriyyin* (the sons of Musa al Sadr). Author Robin Wright explains:

Since his mysterious disappearance, the missing *Imam* had become a *cause célèbre* among the Shi'a, the motive for a long series of violent attacks, hijackings and kidnappings [especially] against Libyan targets and those who did business with Tripoli. Qaddafi had repeatedly and vehemently denied any knowledge of *Imam* Sadr's whereabouts, despite his long record of antagonism toward the Lebanese figure. Three weeks before [a] sixth hijacking, a Rome magistrate had shelved an inquiry into *Imam*

⁸⁰It is interesting to note that rival factions of Lebanese Shi'a have all adopted Musa al Sadr as their organization's martyr. These include Amal, Hezbollah, and Islamic Amal. Each organizations militia members adorn their uniforms with buttons depicting the face of their missing Imam. Ibid, p. 55.

Sadr's fate announcing that investigations had found that 'no crime was committed against Sadr on Italian territory.' This decision ... prompted [infamous terrorist] Hamza to try again. His basic demand, once again, was the release of the *Imam*. 'He is our *Imam*,' Hamza stressed in solemn tones ... as a Catholic might talk of a cardinal, a Tibetan Buddhist about the Dalai Lama.⁸¹

Thus, for Lebanese Shi'a, whether or not Musa al Sadr was still alive was of no consequence. What mattered instead to them was that someone other than the cleric himself was responsible for the Imam's capture, detention, or in the worst case death, and that he should be found out and punished.

With regards to the second dimension - *credibility* - Musa al Sadr adequately fills the requirements as described by our ideal revolutionary martyr profile. The Lebanese cleric meets seven of the nine criteria, falling short in the areas of age and celibacy.⁸² As mentioned earlier in this chapter, however, in Islamic societies celibacy is not an overwhelming indicator of a martyr's virtue. Thus, while being generally accepted as an ideal virtue it may not be as important to a Shi'a as it might be for a Roman Catholic. In any case, Musa al Sadr's *credibility* as a revolutionary martyr remains broad.

It is along the last dimension - *legitimate authority* - that Musa al Sadr's martyrdom stands apart from the other cases we have examined. First, author Fouad Ajami notes:

Hasab [inherited merit] and *nasab* [genealogy] were more important than birthplace. The man who arrived in the coastal town of Tyre as its mufti (religious judge) could trace his ancestry back to an *alim* from the south of Lebanon, and further back still to the seventh *Imam*. The Shi'a world in Iran and Iraq and Lebanon gave Musa al Sadr his legitimacy. The Iranian birthplace, problematic to those Sunni Arabs who asserted the primacy of nationality over faith, did not trouble the men who followed Musa al

⁸¹Wright, p. 48.

⁸²See Appendix B - Table 2 for data concerning Musa al Sadr.

As we established earlier in Chapter II, martyrdom is inextricably linked to the history of Shi'ism. Shi'a (literally the partisans) have long recognized the Prophet's bloodlines as a basis for His religious succession. When Caliph Yazid's troops killed *Imam* Hussein, Shi'a were empowered by a paradigmatic martyr with a sense of righteousness, piety and opposition.⁸⁴ Hussein's death advanced the concept of *shihada* (martyrdom) and elevated it to one of Shi'ism's greatest traditions of allegiance. Yet, the disappearance of the twelfth and last *Imam*, Muhammed al Mahdi in 874 provided a mysticism and millenarian expectation that His return will symbolize a rebirth at the end of time. The *legitimate authority* of Musa al Sadr's martyrdom can only be determined to the extent that it overlapped with these traditional Shi'ite beliefs.

The similarities between the prophecy of the coming *Imam* and Lebanese Shi'a's *Imam* Musa al Sadr are uncanny. These can be summarized as follows:

- 1) Muhammed proclaimed that the *Imam* would be a descendant of the sons of Fatima, the Prophet's daughter. As a *Sayyid*, Musa al Sadr certainly fulfilled this familial distinction.
- 2) His color had to be like an Arab and his body like an Israelite.⁸⁵ Again, the

⁸³Ajami, p. 32.

⁸⁴Ibid, p. 17.

⁸⁵Jassim M. Hussain, The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam: A Historical Background, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); p. 17.

Lebanese *Imam's* striking mediterranean complexion and towering stature fit the bill.⁸⁶

3) Muhammed prophesized that "He will come forth like a sharp, shooting star to fill the earth with justice and equity as it was filled before with injustice and inequity."⁸⁷

Musa al Sadr's rise from the depressed Shi'ite community in Lebanon bore witness to this revelation.

4) The seventh *Imam*, Musa Ibn Jafar, predicted that a cleric from Qom would lead the believers into the path of righteousness.⁸⁸ Musa al Sadr was born in Qom and had received some of his religious instruction in the holy Shi'ite seminaries located there.

5) The Mahdi (the hidden *Imam*) "will guide men to undertake a spiritual and political transformation of society."⁸⁹ Musa al Sadr had initiated both of these societal changes as evidenced by protest fasts, mass demonstrations, general strikes, recognition of non Shi'a sectarian worship rituals, etc.

6) Finally, the twelfth *Imam* had vanished only to reappear at the end of time. The disappearance of Musa al Sadr continues Shi'ite expectations of the coming Mahdi and challenges them to be true to their faith.

Thus, it follows that the Shi'a had more than enough substantial evidence that Musa

⁸⁶Fouad Ajami describes Musa al Sadr as follows: "He cut a striking figure. His looks - he was a very tall man - his aura, and the neatness of his clerical attire marked him as someone different from older Shi'a clerics who now and then came into my house in Beirut, or to my grandparents' home in a southern Lebanese village." Ajami, p. 12.


⁸⁷Hussain, p. 17.

⁸⁸Ibid, p. 25.

⁸⁹Ibid, p. 157.

al Sadr in life reincarnation of their missing *Imam*.⁹⁰ His disappearance could only be considered another one of Allah's tests of their faith as Shi'a. Only through his martyred image could the continued immortalization of their *Imam* and their redemption be guaranteed. The illustration below, Figure 3C, depicts an assessment of Musa al Sadr's martyred image.

FIGURE 3C



Through analytical comparison we have thus determined that it is possible to examine a martyr's proportional strength. Once created, a paradigmatic martyr is still dependent upon the ability of an organization to manipulate its image using a number of differing strategies. In the next section I will address some of these strategies which might be used by organizations and offer an assessment of how and when they should be used during revolutionary operations.

⁹⁰In all fairness, there is one glaring prophetic attribute that Musa al Sadr did not meet as the true Mahdi - his name did not match the Prophet's or the Prophet's grandson, Hussein. However, the invitation to come to Lebanon was extended by Sadr's relative, Abdul Hussein Sharif al Din which lends some credence to the last prophecy.

E. *BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS* - MANIPULATING MARTYRS TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS UPON ORGANIZATIONS

Since the inception of martyrs, religious communities which have claimed these divine images have wrestled with the symbol's power in an attempt to control its impact over an entranced following. As a highly sensational and public act,⁹¹ martyrdom initially exposed religious minorities to authorities in power. Moreover, Mircea Eliade adds: "A practical danger to a politically crescive minority is that some members will initiate open political action, perhaps open rebellion, before the community is ready to support such an act and, therefore, to succeed."⁹² Religious history is replete with examples of the derisive effects of martyrdom on communities.⁹³ On the other hand, a martyr's intrinsic power to incite action is such that it gives its community an unrelenting faith and a psychological edge against a controlling authority. Thus, revolutionary organizations over time have recognized the need to set controls upon this symbolic image, either to moderate or to magnify its impact upon their constituencies.

Bureaucratic controls are usually set to determine potential martyr candidates and to

⁹¹We established earlier that martyrs require audiences, actual or created (see Chapter III). Eliade also states that "A martyr is delegated by [a] community and apotheosized by it.", Hence, no matter how well concealed, they are extremely visible symbols which expose sentiments and ideological beliefs. Eliade, "Encyclopedia," p. 234.

⁹²Ibid, p. 235.

⁹³During the Bar Kokhba Revolt, many Jews sought martyrdom if they were forced to transgress any of the Ten Commandments. Thousands thus willingly gave their lives when Hadrianic rules appeared contrary to Mosaic Law. Later on Rabbis of the period endeavored to restrain the desire for martyrdom by Talmudic Law which denied martyrdom to any who committed suicide or took the life of his offspring unless he were forced to transgress against the laws barring idolatry, adultery, or murder (see Chapter II); Singer, pp. 353-354; and Ibid, p. 235.

delineate propagation efforts of the symbol. Whatever the manner of control, the martyr can be subsequently utilized in a militant orientation or in a more passive orientation. Using the revolutionary martyr cases we just examined for paradigmatic proportionality, let us now explore how their own organizations either succeeded or failed to bureaucratically control their images and hence to determine effective strategies of persuasion.

In the case of Bobby Sands, while some controls for candidacy were set, the operational merit of the consequential martyrs following Sands diminished and their deaths instead resembled a ritualistic sacrifice. It was clear early on that the IRA and its political wing - Sinn Féin - had no effective strategy to control the Maze/Long Kesh hunger strikers. All controls that were initiated were done so by the prisoners, especially after the first failed strike ended in March 1981. Padraig O'Malley writes:

The nature of the offense for which a prisoner had been convicted was a major consideration in the selection process - some were immediately ruled out because their offenses were such that the British could use them to portray the hunger strikers as murderous terrorists who had committed heinous crimes Selection for the short-list was based on a number of other considerations: there had to be a proper geographic spread, and volunteers who were to be released within a short time were rejected, not because their commitment to the hunger strike might be suspect, but on the grounds that they would be more useful to the movement by reinvolving themselves in the struggle when they got released. Volunteers who had broken under interrogation were usually but not always ruled out.... Once a volunteer was short-listed he was told to send a comm to the Army Council [the IRA headquarters] He would receive a comm back from the Army Council reiterating to him once again that ... [they] were opposed to ... [it]. [It became obvious that] their commitment to each other [was] superseding their oath of obedience to the IRA.⁹⁴

In the confines of an isolated prison, an IRA's effort to control the campaign had little

⁹⁴O'Malley, p. 76.

chance for success. But ultimately the strategy was doomed because of the prisoners themselves. O'Malley finally concludes that:

there was no strategy - no clearly defined plan of how to proceed, no contingency arrangements, no back-up cover. There was no agreement as to how long the hunger strike should last or how many should be allowed to die. Sands himself, we are told by some, wanted no one other than himself to die or at least there to be no escalation beyond the initial cluster of four.⁹⁵

The Maze/Long Kesh hunger strike was thus doomed as soon as Sands perished. After the death of the tenth striker, families of the remaining hunger strikers were so moved by their own moral convictions that they interceded and requested that British prison officials force feed their sons. Therefore, the subsequent efforts to hallow and immortalize Bobby Sands and his nine followers were at once undermined, their potentiality for later use debilitated to the point that their names are a mere flash in the long memory of Northern Irish Catholics.

In the case of José Rizal, Bonifacio and the *Katipunan* revolutionaries did not attempt to "operationalize" the revolutionary martyr's image. To have done so would have immediately placed them on weak footing. This is especially so because while alive Rizal was critical of the *Katipunan's* overzealous behavior. In 1896 Rizal wrote:

From the very beginning, when I first received information of what was being planned, I opposed it, fought against it, and I made it clear that it was absolutely impossible ... I was convinced that the very idea was wholly absurd Thoroughly imbued with these ideas, I cannot do less than condemn, as I do condemn, this ridiculous and barbarous uprising, plotted behind my back, which both dishonors Filipinos and discredits those who might have taken our part⁹⁶.

Thus, from the onset it became obvious that *Katipunan* had to rely on alternate, more

⁹⁵Ibid, p. 72.

⁹⁶As cited in Zafra, p. 144.

passive strategies to manipulate Rizal's martyrdom and in this manner they were very successful.

Author Nicholas Zafra notes:

his name was used as a password in the initiation ceremonies of the *Katipunan*, and his picture was displayed in *Katipunan* circles as the liberator of the Filipino race. Andres Bonifacio himself, the founder of the *Katipunan*, had a good collection of documents relating to Rizal which he kept in his archives in the warehouse he worked as a *bodeguero* (wine cellar foreman).⁹⁷

Potentially a robust militant and political symbol, Rizal's image was therefore manipulated to bolster recruitment and to propagate the concept of Filipino nationalism and independence. Initially firmly controlled by Bonifacio and others, Rizal's image succeeded in accomplishing these goals.

In our last case of revolutionary martyrdom, we find the most complete and thorough levels of bureaucratic control over the symbol. Shi'ite revolutionary groups attempted to control both the candidacy of their *consequential martyrs*, as well as manipulate the propagation of Musa al Sadr's image. During their "operationalization" of al Sadr's image, Amal and Hezbollah set the following guidelines for their revolutionaries aspiring to follow in the *Imam's* shadow of Shi'ite martyrdom. First, all potential candidates had to be male. Second, they had to be old enough to have been deemed responsible for their actions, yet still unmarried. Third, they had to have no ties to anyone who might seek out the organization in order to avenge their deaths. Thus, orphans made prime candidates. Finally, they ensured that the individuals were truly motivated by their piety

⁹⁷Ibid, p.142.

toward Allah and were not insane.⁹⁸

The selection process enabled both groups to wield considerable operational strength against their deemed enemies,⁹⁹ as witnessed by the numerous instances of Shi'ite violence in Lebanon during the early to mid - 1980s. One such operation yielded horrific results. On 11 November 1982, 60 Israeli soldiers as well as 14 others died in an explosion which devastated a building in Tyre, Lebanon - Musa al Sadr's adopted community. Reports surfaced that the explosion was caused by a fifteen year old Shi'a youth named Ahmad Qusayr that drove an explosive filled truck into the building and detonated it when the truck crashed.¹⁰⁰ Subsequently, Qusayr's photograph has adorned the streets in southern Lebanon. However, by 1986 these "suicide missions" had devolved into a disastrous operational campaign. Author Martin Kramer notes: "As purer ... martyrs were offered for fewer immediate results, the measure of sacred war in the operations diminished, and that of sacrifice increased."¹⁰¹ Although resembling the IRA's failed operational strategy in steadily increasing losses, the Shi'a were able to regain control of these martyring operations.

Shi'ite clerics, recognizing that the violence was becoming increasingly harmful to their communities in southern Lebanon, actively sought out the revolutionary leadership

⁹⁸Kramer, pp. 38-41.

⁹⁹Kramer reports that Hezbollah targeted American, French, and Israeli forces in Lebanon, while Amal specifically launched attacks against the Israelis inside the country, see *Ibid*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid*, p. 36.

¹⁰¹*Ibid*, p. 41.

in Hezbollah and Amal to change their strategies. At first, the clerics bargained for the adoption of a strategy to promote subsequent martyrdom only when a ratio of ten deaths for every sacrifice could be guaranteed.¹⁰² When this still produced little in the way of a positive effect, the clerics urged the groups to abolish their "action" strategies. Martin Kramer writes:

The Shi'ite clerics understood, as [Rene] Girard [does] that 'the sacrificial act appears both sinful and saintly, an illegal as well as a legitimate exercise of violence.' And when it appeared more sinful than saintly, it had to be banned.¹⁰³

Thus, a conditional ban on the action strategy of propagating consequential martyrdom was agreed upon by all Shi'a, most importantly the revolutionary leadership. Currently it now appears that this ban has caused Musa al Sadr's image to be used in other "passive" strategies.

To honor their national *Imam*, Shi'a have recently reverted to what Fouad Ajami has labelled "ritual repentance."¹⁰⁴ During marches recognizing the anniversary of his disappearance, young Shi'a men are more apt to carry posters bearing the portrait of their *Imam* than to carry guns or explosives. Musa al Sadr's visage has become the Shi'ite community's identification badge and his memory has been transformed into one of hope, a hope that the Lebanese political system will allow for the full participation of Shi'a in the future.

¹⁰²Ibid, p. 43.

¹⁰³Ibid, p. 43.

¹⁰⁴Ajami, p. 207.

F. SUMMARY

Throughout the course of this chapter I have attempted to show that revolutionary martyrs are not inherently equal in symbolic stature. Each revolutionary martyr must be judged upon its social acceptability and its effect upon its audience. First, their acceptability is dependent upon the construction of three social dimensions which help to contribute to a broadened paradigmatic proportionality. Next, organizational strategies in the form of bureaucratic controls help determine the martyr's impact upon a social group. To the extent that martyr images can be manipulated to follow the confines of socially constructed paradigms and to adhere to strategies by organizations waging revolution will decide the symbol's ultimate strength.

V. CONCLUSION

This study began by asserting that martyrs, more than any other symbol in history, have long been a tool of mass persuasion. Aside from the sensational aura that accompanies them, martyrs have been effective because of their associated, represented character. Chapter II analyzed how the associated character of martyrs has evolved throughout history from one of passive asceticism to one of political militancy. This evolution of the martyr's character logically places it as a preeminent symbol in the recent emergence of revolutions where political violence has become injected into social environments throughout the globe. Chapter III described the phenomenon of symbol formation within revolutionary environments, particularly the adoption of heroes, patriots, and martyrs by organizations contending for social and political power. It also explained why martyrs, rather than the latter two figures, are inherently more powerful as individual symbols. Further, we dissected the creation of revolutionary martyrs and showed that they remain as phenomenological social constructs. Their creation is also dependent upon both necessary and sufficient conditions found within their societies. To the extent that these conditions are met, we can predict whether or not revolutionary organizations will adopt or reject martyrs as symbols of persuasion. Chapter IV affirmed that martyrs can never be tarred, so to speak, with the same brush. We can not universally dismiss them as failures, nor can we hold them universally in awe. Thus, I offered a model of paradigmatic proportionality to judge the acceptability of a martyr's image within its

society and I offered an explanation as to how bureaucratic controls may be utilized in manipulating this image from action-oriented strategies to more passive strategies.

Most comparativists that have written about revolution focus on variables which they can empirically measure. They do so in order to numerically or categorically add strength to their argument. This study has certainly not followed their lead. But it is still nonetheless important and valid to an academic community searching for definitive answers to otherwise intangible questions. One such enduring question is why individuals join revolutionary movements when they have no logical reason to believe that their membership in such an organization will definitively turn the tide to victory. It was noted American writer, William Sydney Porter - known also by his pseudonym O'Henry - who stated, "Perhaps there is no happiness in life so perfect as the martyr's." Thus, martyrs as political symbols imbued by an acceptance of a millenarian expectation might indeed offer a valid explanation to this frequently addressed question.

There can also be no doubt that the martyr image has figured prominently in revolutionary movements since the end of the eighteenth century. Recent revolutionary movements, including those which stress the adherence of Marxist/Leninist principles of materialism over idealism, validate this premise. From the Nazi pantheon of fallen saviors to Latin American theological liberationists one thing is certain. Martyrs are here to stay. Even an atrocity such as the mass murder of innocent, worshipping Palestinians in an Islamic mosque in Hebron, however juxtaposed to our rational judgement, has just produced one such exemplar for Rabbi Kahane adherents, members of Kach. Thus, we can not continue to ignore martyrs and their impact upon contending social groups. To

do so would be certainly foolhardy for academics and potentially devastating to those who risk their lives against such rebellious groups and their semi-loyal communities.

Through a proper understanding of the martyr in revolution we can more appropriately devise strategies to either undermine its power after its adoption or negate its creation. In the latter case one can certainly avoid the foundational auspices for the creation of martyrs. One such way to do so would be to incorporate certain controls designed to quell those necessary and sufficient conditions of martyrdom. For example, it has been thus far fruitful for President Fujimori in Peru, who in spite of his threats to kill revolutionary leader Abimael Guzmán, to avoid creating a paradigmatic martyr for Sendero Luminoso. By now many believe Fujimori realizes that by executing the captured Maoist guerrilla leader, he would create a personified object of rivalry and in time possibly tip the scales in favor of the insurgents. Can other controls be implemented? Certainly this is one such topic which may be worthy of additional study.

Attention must also be given to the former case for it too may directly impact upon a martyr's relative strength. Clearly we can point to those dimensions where a revolutionary martyr falls short in the paradigmatic proportionality model. If an authority can publicize and hence establish some reason to doubt either the hallowed image of the martyr or his relationship to his communal group then his substantive persuasive impact can be lessened. Also, those strategies - action oriented or passive - embraced by revolutionary organizations can be utilized against them. It has been known for quite a long time that the funeral processions so popular in the honoring of IRA martyrs have been a venue for the British authorities to identify revolutionaries in attendance.

A martyr's power must also be seen in light of our own offensive psychological warfare strategies and in this manner we must understand how the image can be used toward what we deem as positive ends. Thomas Jefferson stated that: "Politics, like religion, hold[s] up the torches of martyrdom to the reformers of error." America has long lived up to the notion that we are a redeemer nation, whose destiny it is to create a world where individual liberties are not transgressed upon. Our sponsoring of particular "freedom fighters" around the world gives us a semblance of a test bed to either prove or disprove many of the arguments presented in this thesis.

APPENDIX A

Table 1 - REVOLUTIONARY MARTYR'S: A SAMPLE POPULATION

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

NATHAN HALE

NATIONALIST

ROBERT "BOBBY" SANDS

MICHAEL COLLINS

AUGUSTO "CÉSAR" SANDINO

JOSÉ MARTÍ

JOSÉ RIZAL

COMMUNIST

ERNESTO "CHÉ" GUEVARA

HANS BEIMLER

FASCIST

JOSÉ ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA - Falangist

REINHARD HEYDRICH - Nazi

ALBERT LEO SCHLAGETER - Nazi

HORST WESSEL - Nazi

HERBERT NORKUS - Nazi

LIBERATION THEOLOGIAN

CAMILO TORRES

ANTI-CONFESSIONAL

MUSA AL SADR

PRONUNCIAMIENTO LOYALIST

LUIS GUZMÁN MOSCARDÓ

AGRARIAN REFORMER

EMILIANO ZAPATA

HUNG HSIU-CHÜAN

ANTI-MONARCHIST

JEAN PAUL MARAT - Sansculotte

APPENDIX B

Table 2 - REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRS: A DATABASE

	S e x	Age	Trial/ Detention/ Execution 2	Prior Occupation	Movement Leader ₃	Orator/ Noted Literary 4	Celibate 5	Death Omens 6	Education
John Hale	M	21	Yes	Student	No	Yes	UnM	Unk	Advanced
Paul Marat	M	50	No	Doctor/Journalist	Yes	Yes	No	Unk	Advanced
Hsiu-	M	50	No	Teacher/ Mystic	Yes	Yes	Unk	Unk	Failed matriculation
Martí	M	42	No	Lawyer/Writer	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Advanced
Rizal	M	35	Yes	Doctor/Lawyer	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Advanced
Mano Zapata	M	39	Yes	Horse Groomer	Yes	Yes	Unk	Unk	Self Taught
Israel Collins	M	32	No	Postal Worker	Yes	Yes	UnM	Unk	Secondary
Robert Leo Geyer	M	29	Yes	Businessman	Yes	No	UnM	Yes	Began Advanced Degree
Wessel	M	22	No	SA Officer/ Songwriter	Yes	Yes	No	Unk	Gymnasium
Bert Norkus	M	15	No	Student	No	No	UnM	Yes	Secondary
Isidro "Bar" Sandino	M	38	Yes	Miner/Salesman	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Secondary
Antonio de Rivera	M	33	Yes	Politician/Writer	Yes	Yes	Unk	Yes	Advanced
Avventura uti	M	40	No	Metal Worker/Bank Robber	Yes	Yes	No	Unk	Secondary
Beimler	M	40	No	Laborer/Unionist/ Political Officer	No	Yes	Unk	Unk	Secondary
Guzmán cardó	M	24	Yes	Army Officer	No	No	UnM	No	Advanced
Hard drich	M	38	No	SS Obergruppen- führer	Yes	No	No	No	Advanced
Pilo Torres	M	37	No	Priest	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Advanced
esto "Ché" vara	M	39	Yes	Doctor	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Advanced
al al Sadr	M	50	Unk	Cleric	Yes	Yes	No	Unk	Advanced
ert "Bobby" ds	M	27	Yes	Coach Builder /MP/Writer	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Secondary

er's notes: 1) Names arranged chronologically, 2) All martyrs were killed, however, those with a positive response were executed by an agent acting under orders of an authority in power, 3) Leadership skills are based upon the hierarchical level martyr attained within an organization, 4) Refers to whether martyr was noted for oratorical or literary skills, 5) Celibacy is understandably difficult to prove. Therefore, I allowed for four categories of responses - Yes, No, Unmarried - meaning that there may be a likelihood that he was celibate(UnM), and Unknown (Unk). 6) Determined by some form of documentation regarding the martyr's opinion of his own death.

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